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THE NEW WRITS OF ASSISTANCE
Ian Samuel*
The providers of network services (and the makers of network devices)
know an enormous amount about our lives. Because they do, these network
intermediaries are being asked with increasing frequency to assist the
government in solving crimes or gathering intelligence. Given how much
they know about us, if the government can secure the assistance of these
intermediaries, it will enjoy a huge increase in its theoretical capacity for
surveillance—the ability to learn almost anything about anyone. This has
the potential to create serious social harm, even assuming that the
government continues to adhere to ordinary democratic norms and the rule
of law.
One possible solution to this problem is for network intermediaries to
refuse government requests for aid and attempt to sustain those refusals in
court. Although this proposal has received an enormous amount of attention,
there is substantial cause for skepticism about how well it can work.
Congress has given the government wide authority to demand information
and assistance through tools like subpoenas, the Stored Communications Act,
and Title III. Even when the government does not have specific statutory
authorization, courts have interpreted the All Writs Act to authorize a great
deal of open-ended aid, consistent with the well-settled Anglo-American
history of third-party assistance in law enforcement. It is also far from
unheard of for the executive to read restrictions on its surveillance authority
narrowly, and its own inherent powers broadly, to engage in surveillance
that is quasi- or extra-legal.
A superior (or at least complementary) response to the problem is to
restrict network intermediaries themselves by limiting how much they can
learn about us and how long they can retain it. This approach treats
enhanced state surveillance as a problem created by the intermediaries’
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stockpiling of data, and proposes to solve it at the root—which would, as a
useful side effect, solve a number of other problems created by that
stockpiling, too.
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INTRODUCTION
This is better than real memory, because real memory, at the cost of much
effort, learns to remember but not to forget.1

In November 2015, a man died at the home of James Bates, in Bentonville,
Arkansas, in what was alleged to be a murder.2 As part of the investigation,
the police searched Bates’s home and discovered an Amazon Echo3—a
voice-activated personal assistant that is always listening for users’
commands.4 The police wondered whether that microphone recorded

1. UMBERTO ECO, FOUCAULT’S PENDULUM 25 (William Weaver trans., Harcourt Brace
& Co. 1989).
2. Amye Buckley, Bentonville 34-Year-Old Charged in Hot Tub Death, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Feb. 29, 2016, 5:45 AM), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2016/
feb/29/bentonville-34-year-old-charged-hot-tub-death/ [https://perma.cc/Y22F-NULS].
3. Amy B. Wang, Can Alexa Help Solve a Murder Case? Police Think So, but Amazon
Won’t Give Up the Data, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2016, 12:45 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-tn-amazon-alexa-police-20161228-story.html
[https://perma.cc/LM4K-MX5T].
4. Id. (noting that the Echo is “equipped with seven microphones and responds to a ‘wake
word,’” and that when the device “detects the wake word, it begins streaming audio to the
cloud, including a fraction of a second of audio before the wake word”). The Echo is
essentially a “voice-controlled household computer,” which can do things like play music,
order things from Amazon, and read the news. Farhad Manjoo, The Echo from Amazon Brims
with Groundbreaking Promise, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
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anything of interest on the night of the murder.5 The Bentonville police got
a warrant directed to Amazon, seeking any recordings or transcripts that
Amazon had from Bates’s Echo during the critical hours of the murder.6
Amazon resisted,7 but on the eve of a hearing on a motion to quash the
warrant, Bates consented to Amazon turning over whatever data it had from
his Echo, and the company promptly did so.8 Though a legal showdown was
averted, the curious case of the Bentonville Echo nonetheless lingered in the
public and legal imagination.
With increasing frequency, the makers of networked devices and the
providers of network services are being asked to provide interesting sorts of
assistance to the government. Retroactively listening in on an alleged murder
scene is just the start. The government has asked network service providers
to help them listen in on or control people’s cars, for example.9 The police

2016/03/10/technology/the-echo-from-amazon-brims-with-groundbreaking-promise.html
[https://perma.cc/A6QF-EWWP].
5. Wang, supra note 3.
6. Memorandum of Law in Support of Amazon’s Motion to Quash Search Warrant
Exhibit A-1, at 1–2, Arkansas v. Bates, No. CR-2016-370-2 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Feb. 17, 2017)
(Extension for Search Warrant). The attached affidavit notes that the police had searched
Bates’s house specifically to find “electronic devices capable of storing and transmitting any
form of data that could be related to this investigation.” Id. Exhibit A-1, at 5 (Affidavit for
Search Warrant).
7. Tom Dotan & Reed Albergotti, Amazon Echo and the Hot Tub Murder, INFORMATION
(Dec. 27, 2016, 7:01 AM), https://www.theinformation.com/amazon-echo-and-the-hot-tubmurder [https://perma.cc/SQJ8-SXX2]. The story was widely reported in many outlets,
disappointingly few of which could resist variations on the same droll headline. See, e.g., Sean
Gallagher, Police Ask: “Alexa, Did You Witness a Murder?,” ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 28, 2016,
3:45 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/12/police-ask-alexa-did-you-witness-amurder [https://perma.cc/6DQ3-LTT6]; Eliott C. McLaughlin & Keith Allen, Alexa, Can You
Help with This Murder Case?, CNN (Dec. 28, 2016, 8:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2016/12/28/tech/amazon-echo-alexa-bentonville-arkansas-murder-case-trnd/index.html
[https://perma.cc/K5AC-BKET]; Elizabeth Weise, Police Ask Alexa: Who Dunnit?, USA
TODAY (Dec. 29, 2016, 8:13 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/
12/27/amazon-alexa-echo-murder-case-bentonville-hot-tub-james-andrew-bates/95879532/
[https://perma.cc/567S-5BEQ].
8. Tracy Neal, Amazon Will Turn Over Any Data Recorded in Arkansas Man’s Hot-Tub
Death,
ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE
(Mar.
7,
2017,
2:41
AM),
http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2017/mar/07/amazon-will-turn-over-any-datarecorded/ [https://perma.cc/SB6V-ZD52]. Bates consented, according to his attorneys,
because he was “innocent of all charges.” Amy Wang, Can Amazon Echo Help Solve a
Murder?
Police Will Soon Find Out., WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/03/09/can-amazon-echo-helpsolve-a-murder-police-will-soon-find-out/ [https://perma.cc/44L8-9TVS]. Another reason
could have been that because the Echo does not stream anything to Amazon “without the wake
word being detected,” Bates thought it unlikely that the device had captured anything of
interest. Id.
9. See, e.g., Marla Carter, VIDEO: 12-Year-Old Leads Police on High-Speed Chase,
ABC13 (July 1, 2016), http://abc13.com/news/video-12-year-old-leads-police-on-high-speedchase/1409974/ [https://perma.cc/C95A-67HD]. The driver of the car was a twelve-year-old
girl, who apparently reached speeds of almost 120 miles per hour during a chase, at points
squeezing narrowly between cars and into oncoming traffic at rush hour. Id.
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routinely ask cell phone providers to help track their customers’ location.10
The digital forensic chief of London’s Metropolitan Police has openly
dreamed of a world where the police can get help from the makers of
network-connected doorbells to see “who has rung the door,” or even from
companies selling network-connected, camera-equipped refrigerators, to
disprove claimed alibis.11 (Who did eat those plums in the icebox, anyway?)
The government has begun to discover how useful network-attached devices
can be, if only the assistance of network service providers can be procured.
Gradually at first, and lately much faster, those companies have begun to
receive demands that they provide such assistance. These demands take
various forms: from routine legal tools like subpoenas and search warrants,
to the far more exotic commands possible under the open-ended All Writs
Act. For want of an existing umbrella term, this Article refers to them
collectively as “the new writs of assistance.” Given the ubiquity of networkconnected devices, and how much they can learn about our lives, these
commands of aid provide the state with potential access to more information
than has ever been available before.
This Article argues that the government’s use of the new writs of assistance
can provide it with nearly unlimited knowledge about our lives, and that this
is a serious problem.12 This Article also argues that direct resistance to these
orders by the intermediaries is unlikely to mitigate this problem, and that it
is dangerous for these intermediaries to behave as if the government can be
reliably prohibited from using private surveillance infrastructure for its own
ends. Therefore, this Article proposes that we should plan for the possibility
that the government will probably be able to learn anything about us that a
network service provider knows, and we should impose limits on what they
can learn about us and how long they may retain that knowledge.
The basic forces at work have been recognized for some time. Indeed,
there is a vast literature about the private surveillance apparatus.13 This
10. See generally Ian Samuel, Note, Warrantless Location Tracking, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1324 (2008) (discussing the now-common practice by police of tracking suspects through their
cell phones).
11. Sarah Knapton, Fridges and Washing Machines Could Be Vital Witnesses in Murder
Plots, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 2, 2017, 9:04 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2017/
01/02/fridges-washing-machines-could-vital-witnesses-murder-plots/ [https://perma.cc/JE24QUM9]. “The crime scene of tomorrow,” said the official, “is going to be the internet of
things.” Id.
12. The information that network intermediaries have would make it extremely easy, for
example, to construct a database of every Muslim in the United States—including the precise
location of every such person in real time.
13. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 234–38
(2017); BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR
DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 47–49 (2015); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is for, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1912–18 (2013); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace
Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1246 (1998); Alex Kozinski & Eric Nguyen, Has
Technology Killed the Fourth Amendment?, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 15, 16–19; Alan Z.
Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 112–22 (2018); Paul M.
Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1611 (1999);
Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75 MISS. L.J. 139, 152–
55 (2005).
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Article aims to add two things to this literature. The first is a descriptive
account of just how likely it is that the government will gain use of this
apparatus. Here, this Article aims to illustrate just how strong the
government’s hand is and how historically normal it would be for network
intermediaries to be pressed into government assistance. The second is a
related normative claim about why direct regulation of network service
providers is an attractive alternative solution to this problem.
Part I describes the basic problem. It is now possible to gather, transmit,
store, and analyze massive amounts of information about the day-to-day lives
of private people, and private businesses have rapidly emerged to collect and
monetize that private information. The government has gotten interested in
that data, which will soon leave us in a world where the state knows far more
about us than was previously possible. Part II argues that the standard
response to this problem—ex post resistance to requests for aid by network
intermediaries—is unlikely to work. Finally, Part III proposes that the
collection and disposal of personal information be regulated on the front end
to account for the possibility that the government may be able to learn
anything about us that network intermediaries know.
I. AN ACCIDENTAL PANOPTICON
This Part describes the basic problem we are now facing. It is now
technically feasible to collect a massive amount of information about the dayto-day lives of ordinary people, far more than has ever been available before.
In response, private businesses have begun to gather and monetize that
information in enormous quantities. But the government has gotten
interested in this trove of user data for its own purposes—a prospect that this
Part argues is very dangerous.
A. Material and Commercial Origins
of the Private Surveillance State
Rapid advances in a group of technologies have made it possible to collect
enormous amounts of personal information about a large number of people.14
In 1965, Gordon Moore—an electronic engineer and founder of a
semiconductor company—observed that the cost curve of integrated circuits
was improving exponentially, enabling the computing power of such circuits
to roughly double each year.15 Moore predicted that this would continue,
14. I begin with a material story because I regard the legal and policy issues that this
Article addresses as in large part “superstructural, dependent for their form and content upon
determining forces emanating from the economic basis of society.” HUGH COLLINS, MARXISM
AND LAW 22 (1982). There is a robust and interesting debate about the extent to which this
can be said to be true for all legal questions, and if so, what the implications are. See, e.g.,
Mark V. Tushnet, Marxism as Metaphor, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 281, 281 (1983) (reviewing
COLLINS, supra).
15. Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits,
ELECTRONICS, Apr. 19, 1965, at 114–17. Specifically, Moore observed that the cost-effective
number of components on each circuit had been roughly doubling each year, and he expected
that to go on for at least another decade. Id. at 115. Integrated circuits are “arrays of transistors
and other components built from a single chip of semiconductor material,” as opposed to being
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leading to such wonders as home computers and even “personal portable
communications equipment.”16 This prediction turned out to be right, and
the cost of components on integrated circuits has fallen by “roughly a factor
of a billion over the last 50 years.”17 Meanwhile, the costs of storing,
collecting, and transmitting information decreased,18 as our ability to do
those things, as well as our ability to collect and transmit information (using
inexpensive microphones, cameras, and the like) soared.19 For example, the
number of hosts connected to the internet and the price performance of
wireless networking were experiencing similar exponential growth during
that period.20 The overall rate of change in these systems has been
exponential and accelerating.21
It has therefore become possible, in a very short amount of time, to build
and sell cheap, powerful, small computers that collect, transmit, and store
vast amounts of information about the world and individuals.22 Mobile
“circuits constructed from discrete transistors.” PAUL HOROWITZ & WINFIELD HILL, THE ART
OF ELECTRONICS 61 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis added).
16. Moore, supra note 15, at 114. Even an “electronic wristwatch” would be feasible,
Moore thought, at least as soon as a suitable display could be invented. Id. Moore saw the
biggest potential, however, in the “production of large systems,” such as digital filters for
telephone communications. Id.
17. Rachel Courtland, How Much Did Early Transistors Cost?, IEEE SPECTRUM (Apr. 16,
2015, 6:30 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/semiconductors/devices/how-much-didearly-transistors-cost [https://perma.cc/SA7B-XTWZ].
18. See Matthew Komorowski, A History of Storage Cost, MKOMO.COM (Sept. 8, 2009),
http://www.mkomo.com/cost-per-gigabyte [https://perma.cc/7BMV-T5ZF]. In December
1981, a nineteen-megabyte Winchester hard disk cost $5495. Computer Specialties
Advertisement, CREATIVE COMPUTING, Dec. 1981, at 233. By July 2009, it was possible to
purchase a one-terabyte hard drive (one million megabytes) for $74.99—a cost of seven cents
per gigabyte, around four million times cheaper than twenty-eight years prior. Komorowski,
supra; see also Computer Specialties Advertisement, supra.
19. See Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, The Internet of Things Connectivity Binge: What
Are the Implications?, PEW RES. CTR. (June 6, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/06/06/
the-internet-of-things-connectivity-binge-what-are-the-implications/ [https://perma.cc/X86C9EGB].
20. See Ray Kurzweil, The Law of Accelerating Returns, KURZWEIL ACCELERATING
INTELLIGENCE (Mar. 7, 2001), http://www.kurzweilai.net/the-law-of-accelerating-returns
[https://perma.cc/FHX2-7M8N].
21. Id.; see also RAY KURZWEIL, THE AGE OF SPIRITUAL MACHINES 30–32 (1999). Certain
of the conclusions that Kurzweil draws from this are controversial, to say the least. See, e.g.,
Alex Beam, That Singularity Sensation, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 24, 2005),
http://archive.boston.com/ae/books/articles/2005/02/24/that_singularity_sensation/
[https://perma.cc/CM96-G4QF] (noting Kurzweil’s receipt of “hooting skepticism” for certain
of his forward-looking claims). Luckily, one need not sign on to (for example) Kurzweil’s
prediction of a technological “singularity,” in which human consciousness will merge with
machine intelligence, to make use of his descriptive data about the rate of historical change to
this point.
22. One estimate, published in 2011, of the world’s technological capacity to “store,
communicate, and compute information” suggested that over the previous several decades,
our per-capita capacity to compute information had doubled every fourteen months, our
capacity to transmit information had doubled every thirty-four months, and our capacity to
store information had doubled every forty months. Martin Hilbert & Priscila López, The
World’s Technological Capacity to Store, Communicate, and Compute Information, 332
SCIENCE 60, 63–64 (2011). To put this in perspective, this means that every year, humans can
“carry out roughly 60% of the computations that could have possibly been executed by all
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phones, for example, are in constant radio contact with cell towers,
generating information about where we are—and where we are likely to go
next.23 The entire nature of computers is to generate information about the
world they can sense and what they are doing with the data they work on.24
It is now routine to carry around a mobile phone with multiple cameras,
microphones, and other sensors, which are all attached to a high-speed,
always-on network connection.25
Rich business opportunities have been created by this new ability to collect
and process information about private people—and firms have leapt to seize
those opportunities. The term that is generally used to describe this field of
burgeoning opportunities is “surveillance capitalism.”26
Behavioral
advertising (gathering information about people to more precisely target
them with sales pitches) is an enormous business, and it provides the
principal revenue for modern juggernauts like Google.27 Search engine
providers “know if you looked into breast cancer symptoms, sought marriage
counseling, worried whether your kid was autistic, or wondered how to treat
your hemorrhoids,” and your cell phone provider “knows where you’ve
been” and “where you are right at this moment.”28 DVRs know whether you
watch CNN or Fox News.29 Sometimes this information gathering is done

existing general-purpose computers before that year.” Id. at 64. Hilbert and López have, much
like Moore did, charts illustrating this growth on a logarithmic scale—all quite steady looking.
See id. at 62 figs.4–5; see also Moore, supra note 15, at 115–16.
23. See SCHNEIER, supra note 13, at 1–4. As Schneier observes, the “accumulated data
can probably paint a better picture of how you spend your time than you can, because it doesn’t
have to rely on human memory,” and indeed, “researchers were able to use this data to predict
where people would be 24 hours later, to within 20 meters.” Id. at 2; see also Manlio De
Domenico et al., Interdependence and Predictability of Human Mobility and Social
Interactions, 9 PERVASIVE & MOBILE COMPUTING 798, 798 (2013).
24. SCHNEIER, supra note 13, at 13 (arguing that it is the nature of computers to “constantly
produce data” as a “by-product of everything they do”). Schneier notes, “Connect to the
Internet, and the data you produce multiplies: records of websites you visit, ads you click on,
words you type.” Id.
25. See Brian Klug, Some Thoughts About the iPhone 5S Camera Improvements,
ANANDTECH (Sept. 13, 2013, 1:19 AM), http://www.anandtech.com/show/7329/somethoughts-about-the-iphone-5s-camera-improvements
[https://perma.cc/QH6G-TBY5]
(discussing the ever-increasing quality of Apple’s iPhone cameras).
26. Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an
Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 75 (2015). Zuboff argues that “big data” is “the
foundational component in a deeply intentional and highly consequential new logic of
accumulation,” which “aims to predict and modify human behavior as a means to produce
revenue and market control.” Id.
27. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1938
(2013) (citing DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT 260–66 (2010); STEVEN LEVY, IN
THE PLEX 262–63, 336–37 (2011); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING
26–30 (2011)).
28. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 237 (“In theory it may be possible to go off the grid and
avoid opening yourself up to any scrutiny—the Unabomber pulled it off for a while—but for
most of us it is impossible to live that way.”); see also Kozinski & Nguyen, supra note 13, at
16 (discussing how very little can remain private in today’s world and how people must
become aware of the privacy implications of their activities).
29. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 109
(2008).
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to make our lives more convenient.30 Sometimes it is done as a sort of price
subsidy: in order to offer a product for free, a network service provider will
gather data on its users and then monetize that data. As Bruce Schneier puts
it, “Surveillance is the business model of the Internet [because] people like
free, and people like convenient.”31
Consequently, in a relatively short order, we have come to live our lives
online, and in the constant presence of network-attached devices, which
operate according to rules written by their manufacturers to enhance the
profit they can derive from observing us.32 By itself, this situation presents
a legitimate cause for societal concern.33 But it is even more concerning
when the government comes to use the private surveillance system for itself.
B. Leviathan Online
Unsurprisingly, the government has become interested in using this new
trove of data for its own reasons. Location data is incredibly useful in crime
solving because it can establish precisely where a certain person was, and
when.34 But to do this, the government needs the help of the network service
providers—help that the providers are not always eager to give. So the
government frequently resorts to court orders to obtain this data. These
orders can command either the production of information that network
intermediaries already have, the collection of information that they do not yet
have, and could, in a technical sense, command the construction of new
surveillance capabilities for existing devices.
The most basic way the government can use network service
intermediaries to learn about us is by asking them for the information they
already have. This Article refers to these, generically, “orders of
production.” In federal court, both the civil and criminal rules provide broad
subpoena authority for investigators.35 Many administrative agencies and

30. Kozinski & Nguyen, supra note 13, at 15, 23.
31. SCHNEIER, supra note 13, at 49.
32. Henry Farrell, The Tech Intellectuals, DEMOCRACY, Fall 2013, at 51, 56 (“Much of
our life is conducted online, which is another way of saying that much of our life is conducted
under rules set by large private businesses, which are subject neither to much regulation nor
much real market competition.”).
33. See id. at 56–57 (“Facebook users may not like the ways in which Facebook uses their
personal information, but their only real choices are to put up with it or to cut themselves off
from a large part of their social life.”).
34. Samuel, supra note 10, at 1324–25 (“Tracking a suspect’s precise movements may
shatter a claimed alibi: In Scott Peterson’s murder trial, for example, Peterson’s cell phone
records were introduced to establish his whereabouts on the morning of his wife’s murder,
belying his version of the events of that morning.”); see also United States v. Carpenter, 819
F.3d 880, 885 (6th Cir. 2016) (detailing how the government used location data to create “maps
showing that [the defendants’] phones were within a half-mile to two miles of the location of
each of the robberies around the time the robberies happened”), argued, No. 16-402 (U.S.
Nov. 29, 2017).
35. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2) (providing for a subpoena to be quashed or
modified when “compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive”); FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3)
(providing that a subpoena may be quashed when, among other things, compliance would
impose an “undue burden”).
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law enforcement entities have subpoena authority of their own.36 Many
federal statutes authorize the government to demand ex parte that network
service providers hand over information about their customers and records of
their customers’ activities.37 Using subpoenas to obtain personal information
in this way has been routine for at least a decade.38 Specialized warrants and
other statutory procedures also contemplate network service providers giving
over information that they already have.
Even if a network service provider does not already have the information
the government needs, the government may attempt to secure an order
requiring the provider to collect and transfer that information. This Article
calls this sort of order an “order of collection.” That is, the government may
seek an order requiring the network service provider to use the devices a
consumer already has, or the network infrastructure it has built, to gather
information for the government. For example, in the course of a Las Vegas
corruption investigation,39 the government wanted to listen in on
conversations taking place in a particular car.40 The owner had an OnStarlike system in the car, of the sort that assists drivers in “activities from the
mundane—such as navigating an unfamiliar neighborhood or finding a
nearby Chinese restaurant—to the more vital—such as responding to
emergencies or obtaining road-side assistance.”41 The government wanted
to turn the system’s in-car microphone on and listen.42 Such requests have
become fairly routine.43

36. Several federal statutes authorize “federal intelligence investigators (generally the
FBI) to request that communications providers, financial institutions and credit bureaus
provide certain types of customer business records, including subscriber and transactional
information related to Internet and telephone usage, credit reports, and financial records.”
BRIAN T. YEH & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33332, USA PATRIOT
IMPROVEMENT AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005 (H.R. 3199): A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE
CONFERENCE BILL 10 (2006). These “national security letters,” as these pseudosubpoenas are
called, do not require judicial approval, and are subject to nondisclosure provisions that in
certain circumstances forbid the recipient from revealing that they have received such a
request. Id. at 10–12.
37. Id. at 10.
38. See Slobogin, supra note 13, at 140 (“[F]acilitated by the computerization of
information and communication, government routinely obtains personal medical, financial[,]
and email records, in connection with investigations that have nothing to do with business or
governmental corruption.”).
39. Brief for United States at 3, In re Emergency Application for an Order Compelling
ATX Technologies, Inc. to Show Cause, No. 2:01-cv-01495 (D. Nev. Dec. 19, 2001), ECF
No. 1.
40. Id. at 1 (noting that the district court entered an order authorizing “roving
interceptions” in a car).
41. Co. v. United States (In re Application of the U.S. States for an Order Authorizing the
Roving Interception of Oral Commc’ns), 349 F.3d 1132, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003).
42. See id. at 1146. The government lost in that case, although on technical grounds. See
id. (“Because, given the set-up of the System, the surveillance could not be completed with ‘a
minimum of interference,’ the district court erred in ordering the Company’s assistance.”).
43. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 2008 Ohio 2863, ¶ 2 (Ct. App. 2008) (“While monitoring
the vehicle, the OnStar employee overheard the occupants of the vehicle discussing a possible
illegal drug transaction. The employee permitted the Sheriff’s dispatcher to listen to the
conversation.”); Motion to Suppress at 1, United States v. Dantzler, No. 3:10-cr-00024 (W.D.
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Finally, there are yet-more exotic scenarios, where the government obtains
an order for the network service provider to build something new or enable
the collection or production of information that the government wants. This
Article calls these “orders of construction.” For example, in February 2016,
the FBI recovered an iPhone that had belonged to Syed Farook, the object of
a high-profile terrorism investigation.44 The phone had security features
designed to stop anyone other than its owner from easily accessing its
contents.45 The FBI asked Apple to develop a new version of the operating
system without those security features, which the FBI could then install on
Farook’s seized phone to access its contents.46
As the above taxonomy indicates, my principal focus in this Article is
ordinary law enforcement, of the kind conducted through court orders and
normal legal process. But the same dynamics are at work with intelligence
gathering, as well as what Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko have
called the “new policing.”47 This policing refers to police activity that is
“proactive and programmatic, rather than reactive and investigative,” and it
is characterized by universal public surveillance, routine use of
administrative searches, checkpoints, and other forms of investigation not
designed to unearth evidence of any particular crime.48 Both intelligence
gathering and the “new policing” are similar in that they are not founded on
court orders or individualized suspicion.49 That, if anything, deepens the
problem.
Although each of these types of assistance orders is different in important
ways, all share a familial relationship50 in that they all involve network
La. Mar. 31, 2010), ECF No. 17-2 (arguing that law enforcement “effectively ordered OnStar
to assist law enforcement with locating the car Mr. Dantzler was supposed to be driving”).
44. See Ellen Nakashima, Apple Vows to Resist FBI Demand to Crack iPhone Linked to
San Bernardino Attacks, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
69b903ee-d4d9-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html [https://perma.cc/RCB8-L32R]. The
investigation concerned the December 2, 2015, shooting in San Bernardino, California, which
killed fourteen people and injured another twenty-two. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. Specifically, the FBI wanted Apple to develop a version of the operating system
iOS that would permit the FBI to “submit passcodes” to the phone without any “delay between
passcode attempts,” and which would not include the standard “auto-erase function” that wipes
the phone after a certain number of unsuccessful passcode attempts. In re Search of an Apple
iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, No. ED 150451M, slip op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016). Put differently, the FBI wanted to be able to
guess the passcode by brute force, quickly trying every possible passcode with no undesirable
side effects.
47. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1827, 1871 (2015).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1871–72 (noting that as the “mission of many law enforcement officials has
grown or shifted to include intelligence gathering,” the result has been “panvasive dragnets”
that “by their very nature intrude upon the privacy and security of large swaths of the lawabiding public”).
50. I mean this in the sense used by Ludwig Wittgenstein. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 65–66 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Basil Blackwell Oxford
3d ed. 1968) (1958) (arguing that even things that do not all share a single common
characteristic may be “related to one another in many different ways,” describing the
classification of board games, Olympic games, and gaming with dice as “games” as an
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service providers aiding the government. Thus, this Article refers to them
collectively as the “new writs of assistance.” The writ of assistance used to
be a very common method of law enforcement during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.51 The example known best to Americans is the customs
writ of assistance—a “document that in the name of the king ordered a wide
variety of persons to help the customs man make his search.”52 The customs
writ of assistance fell into disrepute and contributed to the coming of the
American Revolution because it was generally issued without particularized
suspicion.53 But that is not necessarily the feature of the writ of assistance
intended to be invoked with its name here. Some of the new writs of
assistance can be issued on very little suspicion, though others require a high
showing.54 Rather, the conceptual similarity is that they require a third party
to help—to assist—with some aspect of otherwise-authorized law
enforcement.
C. A State That Could See Us as God Does
If private network service providers are gathering unprecedented amounts
of information about us, and the government is interested in that information,
the next question is, is that a problem? Is it a problem for the government to
be theoretically able to learn nearly anything about us?
Some government officials believe that it is not a problem at all. In fact,
some believe that the major looming crisis is that network service providers
will not enable enough surveillance, thereby hindering crime solving,
intelligence gathering, and various other worthwhile objectives.55 In 2014,
James Comey—then the director of the FBI—gave a speech at the Brookings
example); cf. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 700–01 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that “the very nature of a game [is] to have no object except amusement (that is what
distinguishes games from productive activity)”). In the legal literature, Daniel Solove has
argued that privacy is best understood using this “family resemblance” idea. Daniel J. Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1099 (2002). Solove also argues that “the
quest for a common denominator or essence . . . can sometimes lead to confusion.” Id. at 1099.
The concept has also been applied in property law, see, e.g., J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of
Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 783–84 (1996), religion, see, e.g., Kent
Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753, 763–64
(1984), and many other areas.
51. M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 29–30 (1978) (stating that the writ of
assistance was “a fairly common feature in the modes of executive rule” then common, and
giving as examples the King’s subjects being commanded to give assistance in the
“impressment of seamen,” the “seduction of ordinance workmen,” and many other things).
52. Id. at 29. For further discussion of the customs writ of assistance, see infra notes 178–
83.
53. SMITH, supra note 51, at 29.
54. See infra Part II.A.
55. See, e.g., James B. Comey, Dir., FBI, Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and
Public Safety on a Collision Course?, Address Before the Brookings Institution (Oct. 16,
2014), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technology-privacy-and-publicsafety-on-a-collision-course [https://perma.cc/G8SC-9SQ8]. Comey argued that we are
“online, in one way or another, all day long,” and our “phones and computers have become
reflections of our personalities, our interests, and our identities.” Id. But Comey lamented that
the government was not “always able to access” this information, which was creating a
“significant public safety problem.” Id.
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Institution calling for legislative changes to solve what he called the “Going
Dark” problem: the failure, in his view, of the law to “keep up with changing
technology and to maintain our ability to actually collect the
communications” the government was interested in.56 This basic idea has
been echoed by some in the scholarly literature. Alan Rozenshtein, for
example, notes that even if the widespread existence of networked devices
enables “a net increase in government surveillance,” that surveillance may be
nonetheless fettered by serious “constraints.”57
These arguments, however, have generally not considered the full scope of
what is possible to know about us with the compelled cooperation of modern
network intermediaries. Such intermediaries have at least theoretical access
to everywhere we go;58 the contents of our communications;59 what we do
and say any time we are within range of a network-attached camera or
microphone;60 everything we purchase, at what price, and from whom; every
website we visit, and when, along with our search history; the amount of time
we spent on each site; what links we clicked, and what ads interested us;61
what goes on in our homes;62 and any other information about us that can be
56. Id. “Kids,” Comey said, have a thing called “FOMO, or ‘fear of missing out.’” Id.
See generally Andrew Przybylski et al., Motivational, Emotional, and Behavioral Correlates
of Fear of Missing Out, 29 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 1841 (2013) (discussing the FOMO
phenomenon). “With Going Dark,” said Comey (in an analogy he evidently could not be
talked out of ahead of time):
those of us in law enforcement and public safety have a major fear of missing out—
missing out on predators who exploit the most vulnerable among us . . . missing out
on violent criminals who target our communities . . . missing out on a terrorist cell
using social media to recruit, plan, and execute an attack.
Comey, supra note 55 (alterations in original).
57. Rozenshtein, supra note 13, at 111. Somewhat relatedly, Orin Kerr has called for
“technology neutrality” in development of Fourth Amendment rules for networked
communications, to ensure that the government’s law enforcement functions are never made
worse off by technology—to ensure the degree of privacy the Fourth Amendment requires
online does not exceed “the degree of privacy protection that the Fourth Amendment provides
in the physical world.” Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A
General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (2010).
58. This information could be inferred from your mobile phone’s location data. It is a
matter of debate whether such access constitutes a Fourth Amendment “search” and whether
this information can be accessed without a warrant or even any constitutional “reasonableness”
constraints, such as probable cause. See Samuel, supra note 10, at 1339–49. The Supreme
Court will soon decide whether or not it can be. See Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402
(U.S. argued Nov. 29, 2017).
59. As long as it is retained, this information is available to the government under the
Stored Communications Act. Under many circumstances, the government may access a
person’s communications without notice to him or her. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) (2012).
60. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 29, at 110 (“Mobile phones can be reprogrammed at a
distance, allowing their microphones to be secretly turned on even when the phone is powered
down. All ambient noise and conversation can then be continuously picked up and relayed
back to law enforcement authorities, regardless of whether the phone is being used for a call.”);
see also United States v. Tomero, 462 F. Supp. 2d 565, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (considering a
case of continuous mobile-phone monitoring).
61. This information is gathered and routinely stored for advertising purposes. See
SCHNEIER, supra note 13, at 52–53.
62. There are already many network-attached home security cameras, which retain
security footage for some time. See, e.g., Nest Aware, NEST, https://nest.com/nest-aware/
[https://perma.cc/5YJE-7UH7] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018) (offering plans that retain video
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algorithmically inferred from the above, such as our religion, our political
opinions, our sexual orientation, our views on Renaissance versus medieval
art, our true opinion about our mothers, or anything else. Essentially all of
this is technically possible now, and it will only get easier as the technological
and commercial forces described above63 continue their march. There has
never been a state in the history of human civilization with the capability to
do these things, which, by itself, is a good reason for caution.64 But, on the
merits, would it be a problem to have a state that could see us as God might?
Or is it wise to “make the Leviathan all seeing so that he may protect us all
the better”?65
Survey evidence indicates that most people would find this world
frightening.66 So does popular literature.67 Almost no one believes that it
would be good to have this kind of all-encompassing record of their life,
especially in government hands.68 The government could never have
from ten to thirty days). The “Nest IQ” is apparently powerful enough to “read the title of a
book printed on a hardcover spine” from across the room. Darrell Etherington, Nest’s Latest
Home Camera Is the Super Smart Nest Cam IQ, TECHCRUNCH (May 31, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/31/nests-latest-home-security-camera-is-the-super-smartnest-iq/ [https://perma.cc/97QP-4FAH].
63. See supra Part I.A.
64. Cf. PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel Tickner eds., 1999) (discussing the
“precautionary principle”); Nassim Nicholas Taleb et al., The Precautionary Principle (with
Application to the Genetic Modification of Organisms) 1 (Sept. 4, 2014) (unpublished working
paper) (on file with the Extreme Risk Initiative, N.Y.U. School of Engineering) (arguing that
if “an action or policy has a suspected risk of causing severe harm to the public domain (such
as general health or the environment),” then “the burden of proof about absence of harm falls
on those proposing the action”).
65. Oral Dissent of Justice Scalia at 10:45, Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (No.
12-207),
https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/roberts6/opinion_announcement_audio/22619
[https://perma.cc/M8UA-Z2YL]. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013), concerned the
legality of taking a person’s DNA without any suspicion that it would reveal evidence of a
crime, id. at 1965–66. The Court approved the practice. Id. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, dissented. Id. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The quotation
about an all-seeing Leviathan does not appear in the written dissent—only the Justice’s oral
statement from the bench—although it was widely reported at the time of the decision. See,
e.g., Joan Biskupic, Analysis: With Trademark Vigor, Justice Scalia Dissents in DNA Case,
REUTERS (June 3, 2013, 3:41 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-scaliaanalysis/analysis-with-trademark-vigor-justice-scalia-dissents-in-dna-caseidUSBRE95211Y20130603 [https://perma.cc/UJ7Y-CJ52].
66. See, e.g., MARY MADDEN & LEE RAINIE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS’
ATTITUDES
ABOUT
PRIVACY,
SECURITY
AND
SURVEILLANCE
5
(2015),
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2015/05/Privacy-and-SecurityAttitudes-5.19.15_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZV6-WN2H]. Overwhelming majorities of
people regard it as important to be in control of who can get information about them and to be
able to speak confidentially about their personal lives with people they trust. Id. at 17.
67. At this point, it is so common for dystopian fiction to feature an omniscient
surveillance state as to be cliché. See, e.g., CORY DOCTOROW, LITTLE BROTHER (2008); DAVE
EGGERS, THE CIRCLE (2013); GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). But the cliché
is the point: it is evidence of a certain kind of fear that is widely held and durable across time.
68. Only 28 percent of people believe that it is reasonable for the government agencies to
maintain records or archives of their activities for “[a]s long as they need to.” MADDEN &
RAINIE, supra note 66, at 25. Even fewer believe that about online advertisers, search engine
providers, or social media sites. Id.
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achieved political consensus to install location trackers on the person of every
citizen, even subject to a promise that the location tracking would only be
activated with a court order.69 That alone suggests that there is a problem:
the government should not be able to acquire a power accidentally that it
could never have acquired on purpose. It is one thing to build something
dangerous and quite another to build it by accident.
On the merits, there are many practical harms that such a large increase in
the government’s theoretical capacity for surveillance might cause. For one,
a government with such an all-seeing theoretical capacity for surveillance
would eliminate the ability of anyone to spend time certain that they were not
being observed, and would thereby deny to everyone what Julie Cohen
describes as the “breathing room” necessary for normal human flourishing
and “the work of self-making.”70 Such a world would be enormously bland
and inhibited: our culture would become less rich as experimentation became
more costly,71 and we would be less informed if we knew all of our interests
might be available to the state.72 Self-censorship in a world like that would
be inevitable, especially for behaviors or views that were unpopular or
politically out of favor.73 And many of the positive liberties we cherish (such
as free speech and assembly) depend on antecedent opportunities to read,
generate hunches, speak with friends, and test out ideas, unobserved.74 This
is all the more true for that speech the First Amendment privileges most:

69. Cf. SCHNEIER, supra note 13, at 47 (“Imagine that the [U.S.] government passed a law
requiring all citizens to carry a tracking device. Such a law would immediately be found
unconstitutional. Yet we carry our cell phones everywhere.”).
70. Cohen, supra note 13, at 1911. Cohen argues that once citizens are subject to
“pervasively distributed surveillance,” they are vulnerable to shaping and modulation by
powerful commercial and political interests—which, in turn, could eliminate the conditions
that make liberal democracy possible in the first place. Id. at 1912. That is an example of a
second-order effect of perfect surveillance, and there are undoubtedly many more that are
difficult to forecast.
71. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426 (2000) (arguing that the possibility that every “first move or false
start” will be monitored will tend to drive people’s behavior toward the “bland and the
mainstream”).
72. If you knew the government might get access to your entire Google search history one
day, would it affect what you looked for?
73. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 488 (2006) (arguing
that pervasive surveillance “can alter the way people engage in their activities” by, for
example, “making them less likely to attend political rallies or criticize popular views”).
Solove’s taxonomy argues generally that “[a]bstract incantations of ‘privacy’ are not nuanced
enough to capture the problems involved” because “privacy violations involve a variety of
types of harmful or problematic activities.” Id. at 480–81; see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S.
1, 13 (1972) (discussing the concept of a chilling effect); Solove, supra note 50, at 1130.
74. Neil Richards has called this “intellectual privacy.” See generally NEIL RICHARDS,
INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2015). Richards
argues that before we can speak freely, we must be able to read freely and communicate our
nascent ideas in confidence. Id. at 11–12; see also Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as
Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 114 (2007) (arguing that “First Amendment
activities are implicated by a wide array of law enforcement data-gathering activities”).
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political speech, critical of the government and of officials we might not want
learning we had been grousing about them in frank terms.75
These concerns are particularly severe when the party observing us is the
government. The government is unique in its ability to aggregate knowledge
from many other sources, no one of which paints quite as complete a portrait
as all of them together.76 Aggregated information can be particularly
dangerous because we are limited in our ability to remember which bits of
information we have given to whom, leading us to make mistakes about how
much we have exposed ourselves to the world.77 Moreover, government
surveillance poses unique risks because the government may exercise
coercive force over us at any time.78 In particular, it would unacceptably
alter the balance of power in our lives by increasing the risks to us of official
misbehavior, both in terms of its likelihood and the harm it could do. All of
these harms still occur even if the government does not, in fact, monitor all
of its citizens at all times, and they can even become more severe,79 as the
uncertainty itself functions as a mechanism of social control.80
These harms have been recognized for some time, but what is new for the
purposes of this Article is the sheer scope of what technology has enabled the
government to learn about us—and thus the magnitude of the threat we are
facing. For most of our history, this sort of knowledge has been impossible,
and so our legal institutions are not designed to account for its harms.81 To
75. On the proposition that political speech is at the core of traditional First Amendment
protections, see, for example, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002)
(holding that “speech about the qualifications of candidates for public office” is “at the core
of our First Amendment freedoms”).
76. See Solove, supra note 73, at 506–11; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 5
(“Policing is just one function of government, and yet it is special. Policing officials are
granted remarkable powers. They are allowed to use force on us.”). To the extent that this
aggregation concern is taken seriously, it would also raise serious issues involving market
concentration by network service providers, who could also be expected to aggregate a great
deal of information about private people. Antitrust law in the United States has traditionally
not regarded such effects as relevant as they do not relate to prices, though there is a reemerging strain in the antitrust literature, known as “economic structuralism,” that questions
an exclusive focus on price. See, e.g., Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126
YALE L.J. 712, 717 (2017).
77. Solove, supra note 73, at 507–08. Solove notes that “aggregated information can
reveal new facts about a person that she did not expect would be known about her when the
original, isolated data was collected”—upsetting people’s expectations in “unanticipated
ways,” as we all “give out bits of information in different settings,” with at least some
expectation that “in each disclosure, [we] are revealing relatively little about [ourselves].” Id.
78. Cf. id. at 487–88 (noting a quintessentially “modern” kind of problem that involves
not immediate insult or harm to a person but a greatly enhanced risk that “a person might be
harmed in the future”).
79. Id. at 495 (discussing harms resulting from situations where “people are generally
aware of the possibility of surveillance, but are never sure if they are being watched at any
particular moment”).
80. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 200 (1977). That was the essence of
Jeremy Bentham’s proposal for a “Panopticon,” a prison designed such that any guard could
see any prisoner at any given moment, but no prisoner could be sure whether he was or was
not being watched. Id. Bentham really meant it; Foucault’s account is less warm.
81. As Justice Alito has observed, “In the precomputer age, the greatest protections of
privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical.” United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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monitor even a single person’s movements, for example, would once have
required vast resources in the physical world—agents, helicopters, cars, and
binoculars, all working endlessly.82 Today it requires a single court order
directed to a phone company. The technical and practical constraints on
government surveillance are gone—all that remains are legal ones.
We need not agree at this stage on what precisely the state ought not to be
able to learn about us. You might be bothered by the idea of a modern-day
“pink file,”83 documenting the sexual orientation of everyone in the
country.84 I might be bothered by a database of people’s movements. A third
person might object to a government database of our website-reading habits.
What precisely is too dangerous to give to the state is a substantive question
that will be relevant later, but for now what matters is that we are barreling
rapidly toward a world in which the state can learn anything about anyone.
If that is a problem, how do we stop it?
II. A PESSIMISTIC VIEW OF EX POST RESISTANCE
But what is the danger? Can’t the companies that store so much of our
data simply refuse government requests for assistance—won’t they, surely,
in this post-Snowden era? Won’t they have powerful allies in courts, staffed
by neutral, life-tenured judges skeptical of executive overreach? And won’t
their combined lobbying powers in Congress, at any rate, ensure that their
valuable private-surveillance model is protected at any cost? Alan
Rozenshtein argues for something like this view: that network intermediaries
have significant practical ability to resist helping the government with law
enforcement and surveillance.85 Rozenshtein calls these actors, in what is
perhaps a bit of deck stacking, “surveillance intermediaries.”86 He argues
that they are incentivized to resist state demands for aid, and, more
importantly, that they will be effective in that resistance.87 Rozenshtein
argues that refusing to voluntarily give up users’ information and instead

82. Id. (noting that pervasive location surveillance “would have required a large team of
agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance,” which would only be undertaken in
unusual circumstances).
83. See Lukasz Szulc, Operation Hyacinth and Poland’s Pink Files, NOTCHES (Feb. 2,
2016),
http://notchesblog.com/2016/02/02/operation-hyacinth-and-polands-pink-files/
[https://perma.cc/P6X7-YNCS].
84. In the 1980s, the Polish security services set out to create a database of all the gay
people in Poland. Iwona Zielinska, Who Is Afraid of Sexual Minorities? Homosexuals, Moral
Panic, and the Exercise of Social Control 4 (Ctr. for Criminological Research, Sheffield Univ.,
Occasional Paper 1, 2005), https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.784!/file/Iwona
_paper2.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9GA-2NE9]. It was called Operation Hyacinth, and it resulted
in the creation of many bureaucratic dossiers. Szulc, supra note 83. One leader in a Warsaw
gay-rights organization recalls that he was arrested and interrogated, and “the investigators
filled in a document entitled ‘The Dossier of a Homosexual.’” Id. “Above all,” he recalls,
“they asked for names” of other gay people in Poland, but they also asked about a great deal
more (including “preferred types of lovers”). Id.
85. Rozenshtein, supra note 13, at 122–44.
86. Id. Though, in fairness, “the new writs of assistance” is not exactly a study in
neutrality, either.
87. Id. at 116.
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insisting that the government prove some legal entitlement to it will generally
hamper the government’s efforts in a serious way.88
This strategy (collect the information now, resist handing it over later) was
prominently on display during Apple’s 2016 dispute with the FBI.89 Apple
very publicly refused to build the software that the government wanted.90
The government sought a court order, and dozens of technology companies
rushed to Apple’s side.91 A high-profile showdown on the extent of a
company’s responsibility to assist the government was averted, however,
because the government, without Apple’s help, was able to access the data
stored on Farook’s iPhone, and so dropped its request.92 Ultimate resolution
of the scope of third-party assistance duties was therefore forestalled, but the
litigation strategy obviously reflected at least a reasonable assessment of its
chances by the network companies involved.
This Part calls for greater skepticism of the prospects for this sort of ex
post resistance. The government’s hand in such disputes is much stronger
than is widely recognized. Current law is incredibly favorable to the new
writs of assistance, and the legislature has repeatedly demonstrated its
willingness to change the law to ensure that the government gets the help it
needs. Even absent specific statutory authorization, courts—relying on our
long history of compelled private assistance for law enforcement—generally
require aid to the government anyway. And even on those occasions where
courts and legislatures have tried to keep information out of the government’s
hands, the executive has generally been able to get what it wants anyway, by
generously interpreting its inherent powers, reading the limits imposed on it
narrowly, and avoiding court involvement where possible. This “threat
model”93 illustrates how fragile an ex post resistance strategy really is, and

88. Id. at 122–34. Rozenshtein calls this “proceduralism and litigiousness.” Id. at 122.
89. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
90. Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016),
http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/ [https://perma.cc/W9BJ-AL8V]. Cook, the CEO of
Apple, explained that iPhone users, including him, store “an incredible amount of personal
information, from our private conversations to our photos, our music, our notes, our calendars
and contacts, our financial information and health data, even where we have been and where
we are going,” and that what the FBI wanted, in Apple’s view, was for the company to build
“something we simply do not have, and something we consider too dangerous to create”: “a
backdoor to the iPhone.” Id.
91. Amicus briefs in support of Apple were filed by (among others) Facebook, Google,
Amazon, Kickstarter, Reddit, Twitter, Dropbox, Evernote, Nest, Slack, the ACLU, AT&T, the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Jesse Jackson, and (most august of all) thirty-two law
professors. See Press Release, Apple, Amicus Briefs in Support of Apple (Mar. 2, 2016),
https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2016/03/03Amicus-Briefs-in-Support-of-Apple/
[https://perma.cc/H5T4-4C5F].
92. Government’s Status Report, In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the
Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, No. 16-cm-10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28,
2016).
93. See Kendra Albert, Computer Security Tools & Concepts for Lawyers, 20 GREEN BAG
2D 127, 130 (2017) (“Basically, the idea behind threat modeling is that different risks require
different protections. The steps to prevent or mitigate a thief stealing one’s laptop to resell it
are very different from the steps taken to prevent a litigation opponent from hacking into one’s
email server. Identifying one’s threats is the key towards successful security practices.”).
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the compelling need to develop something superior to it if we are concerned
about the problem outlined in Part I.
A. Legislative Accommodation of Government Aid
This Part argues that the government today enjoys wide-ranging legislative
authorizations to get information and assistance from third-party network
service providers. When courts have read those authorizations narrowly,
legislatures have generally amended them to make clear that the government
can get whatever help it needs.
Legislative authorization for “orders of production”94 is already quite
broad. If the government wants a network service provider to give it
information it has about a customer, all it generally has to do is ask. The
easiest of these tools is a subpoena. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
require clerks of court to issue blank subpoenas to prosecutors, which they
then fill out themselves;95 such subpoenas may order the production of any
“documents, data, or other objects the subpoena designates.”96 Criminal
subpoenas are judged by incredibly loose standards. The government is often
deemed to be entitled “to every man’s evidence,”97 and in grand jury
proceedings, the object of a subpoena is not even permitted to argue that the
information sought is irrelevant.98 Subpoenas need not be supported by
probable cause,99 and they may be issued on the mere suspicion that the law
is being violated, “or even just [to obtain] assurance that it is not.”100 There
are only a small number of grounds for resisting a subpoena,101 none of which
are robust enough to deal with the danger we are concerned with here. A
claim of privilege is usually not available to a third-party network service
provider,102 and a claim that assembling the records is too burdensome is
94. See supra Part I.B.
95. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a).
96. Id. r. 17(c)(1).
97. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972)).
98. Id. (noting that the object of a grand jury subpoena is not “entitled to urge objections
of incompetency or irrelevancy” or “‘challenge the authority of the court or of the grand jury’
or ‘to set limits to the investigation that the grand jury may conduct’” (quoting Blair v. United
States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919))).
99. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 228 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Thus, unless
subpoenas are warrants, they are limited by the general reasonableness standard of the Fourth
Amendment (protecting the people against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’), not by the
probable cause requirement.”).
100. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642–43 (1950); see also United States
v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) (noting that the “function of the grand jury is to
inquire into all information that might possibly bear on its investigation until it has identified
an offense or has satisfied itself that none has occurred”); Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 701 (“A
grand jury investigation ‘is not fully carried out until every available clue has been run down
and all witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been committed.’”
(quoting United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1970))).
101. See Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 806
(2005) (enumerating essentially “three grounds for resisting a subpoena: privilege,
burdensomeness, and irrelevance” and explaining that none are typically successful).
102. Id. at 822–26 (noting that Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections for information
held by third parties are “virtually nonexistent”). As Slobogin notes and as this Article argues
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“almost always doomed to failure.”103 This low standard is generally
justified on the ground that it would be impossible to ever generate probable
cause for more intrusive searches and seizures (or formal charges) if
investigators could not require the production of information from parties of
interest.104 Even absent a grand jury, the government is authorized to issue
administrative subpoenas directly in many contexts, which are judged by
similarly loose standards.105 Most notoriously, Congress has authorized the
FBI to issue so-called “national security letters,” which order the production
of certain information if the government merely certifies it is relevant to an
ongoing terrorism or intelligence investigation.106
With regard to network service providers specifically, Congress has
authorized the government to seek production of customer information under
the Stored Communications Act (SCA).107 Enacted as part of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986108 and amended several times since,109
the law authorizes the government to “require the disclosure by a provider of
electronic communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic
communication . . . pursuant to a warrant,”110 and to “require a provider of

above, the “historical change in this setting has not been in the law, but in the extent to which
personal information is now housed with third parties.” Id. at 826; see also supra Part I.
103. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 135 (2d ed. 1999); see also
Slobogin, supra note 101, at 806.
104. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906) (“Of what use would it be for the
legislature to declare these [acts] unlawful if the judicial power may close the door of access
to every available source of information upon the subject?”); Parks v. FDIC, 65 F.3d 207, 218
(1st Cir. 1995) (Selya, J., dissenting) (“This incipient problem—the need to hitch the horse in
front of the cart—is frequently exacerbated because the subpoena power has great significance
for most administrative agencies in the conduct of important public business.”).
105. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 643 (noting that when “investigative and accusatory
duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too, may take steps to inform itself
as to whether there is probable violation of the law”); see United States v. Powell, 379 U.S.
48, 57–58 (1964) (noting that administrative subpoenas need only be founded on a “legitimate
purpose”); see also Slobogin, supra note 101, at 815 (discussing the “move toward the current
regime of virtually unlimited subpoena power”). For an example of a statute authorizing
administrative subpoenas, see 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (2012); see also Doe v. United States, 253
F.3d 256, 262–65 (6th Cir. 2001) (determining what is required under the statute to issue an
administrative subpoena).
106. For an overview of the development of national security letters (NSLs), see Andrew
E. Nieland, Note, National Security Letters and the Amended Patriot Act, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
1201, 1206–13 (2007). Authority for NSLs is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2709.
107. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012). The Act applies to “remote computing service[s],”
defined as “the provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by means
of an electronic communications system.” Id. § 2711(2).
108. Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 201, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860–68 (1986) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711).
109. For an overview of the Act and how it has changed, see generally Orin S. Kerr, A
User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (emphasis added). The Act draws a distinction between the
contents of a communication stored for more or less than 180 days. Id. Some courts have held
that this distinction cannot be squared with the Fourth Amendment. See United States v.
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010); Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d
892, 903 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S.
746 (2010).
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electronic communication service or remote computing service to disclose a
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber” upon a showing of
“reasonable grounds” to believe that the information is “relevant and
material” to an ongoing investigation.111 Anything other than the contents of
a communication, in other words, must be produced only upon a showing of
relevance to some ongoing investigation.112
The government can and does use its power under the SCA to force the
disclosure of enormous amounts of sensitive information about the users of
network services. An example is the government’s showdown with Twitter
over WikiLeaks.113 As part of the investigation into Chelsea Manning’s leak
of classified information, the government requested an order under the SCA
for information about three users, none of whom was Manning.114 The
government wanted “account names and user IDs, all personal addresses,
payment information, session times, and IP addresses for devices from which
tweets were sent,”115 all of which could be “intensely revealing.”116 And in
the end, the government won.117
Current law is also broadly accommodating of “orders of collection.” The
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) requires
any “telecommunications carrier” to “ensure that its equipment, facilities, or
services . . . are capable of” being used by “the government, pursuant to a
court order or other lawful authorization, to intercept . . . all wire and
electronic communications” transmitted by those services.118 CALEA left
“information services” out of its scope,119 and specifically provided that a
service provider had no responsibility for “decrypting, or ensuring the
government’s ability to decrypt, any communication.”120 But those are
statutory affordances that reflected a political compromise in 1994—one
many would like to see altered today. Rozenshtein, for example, has
suggested that it may be necessary to “demand technological impact
assessments before a technology company develops a product or service that
disrupts a key government function like effective surveillance.”121 Network
service providers of any meaningful size would likely obey such changes if

111. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)–(d) (emphasis added).
112. Of course, to the extent that such production would represent a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment, the Act could not alter relevant constitutional requirements. In United
States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), argued, No. 16-402 (U.S. Nov. 29, 2017),
the government sought the disclosure of a subscriber’s location records, id. at 884. The
Supreme Court will soon decide whether or not disclosing that information constitutes a Fourth
Amendment “search,” and if so, whether a warrant is required. See Carpenter v. United States,
No. 16-402 (U.S. argued Nov. 29, 2017).
113. For an in-depth discussion of this incident, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 235–38.
114. Id. at 236.
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting In re § 2703(d) Order, 787 F. Supp. 2d 430, 439 (E.D. Va. 2011)).
117. Id.
118. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2012).
119. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(A).
120. Id. § 1002(b)(3).
121. Rozenshtein, supra note 13, at 182.
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they were implemented.122 Federal law also permits court orders requiring
the activation of microphones in people’s personal devices to listen in on their
oral communications.123 And the Pen Register Act similarly requires the
provision of “all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to
accomplish the installation of the pen register.”124
Legislatures, moreover, have displayed an enormous willingness to modify
the law to ensure that the government can get the assistance it needs for
authorized investigations. In the middle of the twentieth century, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided two cases that—doctrinally—provided an enormous
amount of protection for the users of telephones. Decades earlier, the Court
had held in Olmstead v. United States125 that government wiretaps were not
“searches” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment because they are
accomplished without physical intrusions into the home.126 But in Berger v.
New York,127 the Court changed course, invalidating New York’s
wiretapping statute on the ground that it did not require an adequate showing
by the government before the wiretap was installed.128 And in Katz v. United
States,129 the Court formally overruled Olmstead, concluding that
“electronically listening to and recording [a person’s] words” constituted “a

122. By way of analogy, before the relaxation of export controls on cryptography in the
United States, commercial software providers almost universally obeyed such controls. See
Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
416, 433–41 (2012) (detailing the history of the “crypto wars”). Interestingly, however, even
during this period, free software that implemented strong encryption was “widely available on
the Internet.” Id. at 439 & n.48 (discussing PGP—short for “Pretty Good Privacy”). The extent
to which pseudo-samizdat free software could again preserve a measure of privacy even in a
world of strict design limits is an interesting question, but beyond the scope of this Article.
123. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2012); see also United States v. Oliva, 686 F.3d 1106, 1110–11
(9th Cir. 2012) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 2518); United States v. Tomero, 462 F. Supp. 2d 565,
568 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 3124(a) (2012).
125. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
126. Id. at 466. This happened, it is worth noting, over the vigorous objection of the
telephone companies—the network intermediaries of their day—who filed a crisp eight-page
amicus brief in support of Olmstead. See generally Brief in Support of Petitioners’ Contention,
Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (Nos. 493, 532, 533). It was the “very nature” of the telephone service
to be private, the companies argued, and the “wire tapper destroy[ed] this privacy.” Id. at 4.
Foreshadowing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), the companies even argued that a
wiretap must surely count as a search because it invaded a person’s home without a warrant:
“[h]aving regard to the substance of things,” a wiretapper “would not do this more truly if he
secreted himself in the home of the citizen.” Brief in Support of Petitioners’ Contention, supra,
at 4–5; cf. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (holding that “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained”
without a physical intrusion is a Fourth Amendment search).
127. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
128. Id. at 57–59. Specifically, the Court objected that New York’s statute authorized the
“indiscriminate use” of wiretaps: it authorized wiretapping “without requiring belief that any
particular offense has been or is being committed” and without requiring the conversations
sought to be “particularly described,” it permitted long interceptions with indefinite
extensions, and it provided neither notice to the target (!) nor any showing of “exigent
circumstances” to excuse the requirement of notice. Id. at 58–60.
129. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”130 The
effect of Berger and Katz together was to seriously restrict, on constitutional
grounds, the government’s ability to intercept telephone calls—an almost
total reversal of Olmstead and a doctrinal victory for the telephone companies
and their users.
But legislatures responded by modifying the law to accommodate the
constitutional concerns while still permitting the government to collect the
information it wished to have. The day after Berger was decided, the Speaker
of the New York State Assembly pledged to modify New York’s wiretapping
laws to comply with Berger and ensure that the government could continue
to intercept calls.131 In June 1968, the state did just that, imposing new
procedural safeguards that set a low bar (such as naming the person being
investigated, the crime of which they were suspected, and the site at which
the wiretapping order was to be used).132 And in June 1968—almost a year
to the day after the Court’s decision in Berger—Congress passed Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968133 (the Wiretap
Act), which created a warrant system for wiretapping to comply with both
Katz and Berger and to ensure the government could still collect the
information it wished.134
When court decisions limiting government access to information are based
on statutory interpretation rather than constitutional interpretation, a
legislature can swiftly act to change the law on which the decision is based,
as the events after Title III’s enactment illustrate. Title III gave the
government the authority to eavesdrop on telephone conversations, at least
upon an appropriate showing. But what if it needed help from the phone
companies to do it? In 1970, the FBI sought an order authorizing it to listen

130. Id. at 353. Katz was charged with transmitting illegal gambling wagers across state
lines by using a telephone booth; FBI agents attached a listening device to the outside of the
booth, and introduced the recordings at Katz’s trial. Id. at 348.
131. See, e.g., Sidney E. Zion, Travia Foresees New Bugging Law: Expects Albany to
Provide ‘Adequate Safeguards,’ N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1967, at 25. Zion’s article hedges that
whether such a statute would be possible was “in doubt,” partly because “the majority decision
was unclear,” id., and partly because Justice Byron White’s dissent insisted that the majority’s
conditions would be “almost impossible to satisfy,” id. (quoting Berger, 388 U.S. at 113
(White, J., dissenting)). Anthony J. Travia, then Speaker of the New York State Assembly,
was more optimistic (although admirably candid about his ignorance), telling Zion: “I haven’t
read the decision yet, but from what I am told it appears to me that they haven’t declared
eavesdropping and wiretapping unconstitutional per se, just that this particular statute did not
provide adequate safeguards.” Id.
132. Rockefeller Signs Bill That Permits Police Wiretapping, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1968,
at 49. In a signing statement, Governor Rockefeller enthusiastically endorsed electronic
surveillance as the “‘single most effective’ weapon against organized crime.” Id.
133. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
§§ 801–804, 82 Stat. 197, 211–225 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012)).
The legislation included findings from Congress that “[t]he interception of [wire and oral]
communications to obtain evidence of the commission of crimes or to prevent their
commission is an indispensable aid to law enforcement and the administration of justice.” Id.
§ 801(c), 82 Stat. at 211.
134. Id. § 802, 82 Stat. at 216 (creating a new statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2516, entitled
“Authorization for Interception of Wire or Oral Communications”).
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in on conversations taking place on a telephone line.135 The FBI sought a
further order requiring the telephone company to give it “facilities, services
The
and assistance” necessary to “effectuate the interception.”136
government asked for the phone company’s “consent” to the entry of the
order of assistance, but was refused.137 The district court denied the
government’s request, concluding that the Wiretap Act did not authorize such
assistance,138 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.139 On appeal, the government
invoked “the ancient principle, still recognized and applied, that law
enforcement officers may assemble a posse comitatus, whereby private
citizens may be required to help the police to keep the peace, and to pursue
and arrest law violators.”140 But the Ninth Circuit disagreed.141 The court
observed that the Wiretap Act was “extensive,” stating “in precise terms”
what wiretaps were prohibited and which were permissible, and making
“meticulous provision” for the manner of obtaining approval, making use of
the information obtained, etc.142 Given that, and the conceded “total absence
of any provision even hinting that the court is to have authority to enter such
a unique order as the Government here seeks,” the court of appeals concluded
that Congress had meant to “limit approved interceptions to those which
could be accomplished without the active assistance of the carrier, or at least
to those in which that assistance would be forthcoming on a voluntary
basis.”143 As for posse comitatus, the Ninth Circuit said only that it was “not
convinced” that the power “to compel a telephone company to assist in the
investigation of suspected law violators” was analogous to the power that law
enforcement had “to assemble a posse comitatus to keep the peace and to
pursue and arrest law violators.”144
The government was not pleased with this result, however plausible the
Ninth Circuit’s reconstruction of legislative intent may have been, and
Congress’s reaction was “immediate.”145 President Nixon signed the District
of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 on July 29,
1970, just two months after the Ninth Circuit’s decision, amending Title III
to reverse the outcome of In re United States.146 Section 2518 was amended
to require that a phone company furnish the government “all information,
135. In re United States, 427 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1970).
136. Id. For example, the FBI wanted the telephone company to supply “leased lines and
connecting wires or bridges.” Id. at 640 n.1.
137. Id. at 640.
138. Id. at 640–41.
139. Id. at 644.
140. Id. at 642.
141. Id. at 644.
142. Id. at 643. At this point, the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. New York
Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977), was still a few years in the future. It is a fair question
whether the Ninth Circuit’s decision could or would have come out the same way had New
York Telephone Co. already been on the books. Nonetheless, whatever the weaknesses of the
Ninth Circuit’s decision doctrinally, the legislative response detailed in the text establishes the
main point: that victory in the courts may presage legislative defeat.
143. In re United States, 427 F.2d at 643–44.
144. Id. at 644.
145. United States v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 616 F.2d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 1980).
146. 427 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1970).
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facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception
unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services”
provided.147 The new provision was enacted with “little debate.”148 Indeed,
in the bill itself, this change is simply labeled a “conforming amendment.”149
The result is that the Wiretap Act now commands, in explicit terms, the
technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception of
communications “unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference” to the
provider’s services.150 The Pen Register Act now contains a similar
provision.151 These requirements are not particularly specific, and do not
resolve crucial questions: how much interference with the provider’s
services is too much? Is there any outer limit on how much technical
assistance (or of what sorts) a company would have to provide? Presumably,
yes—but the matter is not addressed in the statute itself, which is another way
of saying Congress had no interest in spelling out such a limit.
When it comes to the new writs of assistance, the government has already
begun to push for legislative solutions to anticipated court-based resistance.
That was the upshot of James Comey’s 2014 “Going Dark” speech, as
discussed earlier152: Comey noted that “[o]ur phones and computers have
become reflections of our personalities, our interests, and our identities.”153
But he lamented that the government was not “always able to access” this
information, which was creating a “significant public safety problem.”154 He
called for legislative changes to “keep up with changing technology and to
maintain our ability to actually collect the communications” the government
was interested in.155 Specifically, Comey proposed that the network service
providers be required to build in “intercept solutions during the design
phase”—that is, to ensure that their products could always, in principle, be
used for surveillance.156 Although no such legislation has yet been enacted,
the government has continued to press Congress for action: for example,
during the FBI’s dispute with Apple over the San Bernardino shooting,
Comey testified before the House Intelligence Committee that the question
of third-party assistance “isn’t going to be answered in the courts, and
shouldn’t be”; rather, it was Congress “that should be determining the

147. Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 211(b), 84 Stat. 473, 654 (1970) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2518(4) (2012)). A later amendment also provided that the telephone company was
to be “compensated therefor by the applicant for reasonable expenses incurred in providing
such facilities or assistance.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4).
148. H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, at 13 (1994). The 1994 report also confirms that the 1970
amendment was a response to In re United States. Id.
149. Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 211, 84 Stat. at 654.
150. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4).
151. See 18 U.S.C. § 3124(a)–(b) (2012).
152. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
153. Comey, supra note 55.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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answers.”157 Comey’s prior remarks, of course, left no doubt about what that
answer should be: a change in the law to enable greater government
surveillance than present doctrine might permit.158
In sum, Congress has already afforded the government enormous power to
issue and enforce the new writs of assistance and has generally demonstrated
its willingness to extend those powers when asked. Of course, many of the
new writs of assistance are (after all) new, and so many of them do not have
specific statutory authorization. What then? What about when the
government wants to get a court to order assistance of a kind that is not
contemplated by any statute?
B. The Historically Normal Roots of Compelled Third-Party Assistance
Even when it comes to more exotic orders of construction (like the Apple
case), or when the government wants orders of collection or production
where there may not be specific statutory authority, the Supreme Court has
held that the All Writs Act159 authorizes courts to require third-party
assistance as necessary to carry out otherwise-authorized investigations.160
Such commands may issue only under “appropriate circumstances,”161 a term
the Court has not much elaborated on—observing only that a third party
should not be too far removed from the underlying controversy, and that it is
best if the assistance is not too burdensome.162 But from early English law
to the present, the government has sought and received both compelled and
active assistance from private parties—even when those third parties did not

157. Eric Lichtblau & Nick Wingfield, F.B.I. Chief Presses Congress to Act on Data
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/technology/fbichief-presses-congress-to-act-on-data-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/NLF4-EVUC].
158. Some legislators seemed perfectly happy to indulge the FBI. Representative Jim
Sensenbrenner “guarantee[d]” at one hearing that Apple would not “like what comes out of
Congress.” Roger Cheng, Apple, FBI Face Off Before Congress over iPhone Encryption,
CNET (Mar. 1, 2016, 3:30 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/apple-fbi-face-off-beforecongress-over-iphone-encryption-san-bernardino-terrorist/ [https://perma.cc/T696-RERW].
Meanwhile, two Senators reportedly developed legislation that would have implemented the
FBI’s preferred solution. See Cory Bennett, Senate Encryption Bill Draft Mandates ‘Technical
Assistance,’ HILL (Apr. 7, 2016, 10:49 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/275567senate-intel-encryption-bill-mandates-technical-assistance [https://perma.cc/J9YH-F9TP].
159. The All Writs Act was enacted by the first Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of
1789. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a) (2012)). In its original form, it provided that the “courts of the United States, shall
have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially
provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective
jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law.” Id. § 14, 1 Stat. at 81–82. It
is codified today in substantially the same form. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
160. United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172–74 (1977) (holding that courts may
“issue such commands” to third parties “as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate and
prevent the frustration of orders it has previously issued” when those third parties, “though not
parties to the original action or engaged in wrongdoing,” are in “a position to frustrate the
implementation of a court order or the proper administration of justice”).
161. Id. at 174. This reflects the text of the All Writs Act itself, which requires that
whatever writs are issued be “agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a).
162. Cf. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174–78.
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wish to help and even when their reasons for not helping were entirely
legitimate. This history is relevant because the All Writs Act and precedent
interpreting it are open ended, leaving courts to turn to history as a baseline
against which to measure their decisions.163 The history of the common law
is doctrinally relevant,164 and might be thought especially so when the
doctrine itself is unclear or open ended. The fact that it is historically normal
for third parties to be required to aid the government is therefore a serious
problem for the ex post resistance strategy. This Part explores that history in
some detail.
At the time of King Edward I’s reign in England, in the thirteenth century,
there were no professional police forces;165 rather, when a felony was
committed, what was called the “hue and cry” was to be raised.166 If an
ordinary resident of a town came upon a dead body, he was required to raise
the hue167—and if he did not, he was committing a separate offense, for
which he could be fined.168 The hue would be transmitted from village to
village by shouting and horn-blowing until the felon was apprehended.169
And private people were not just expected to help apprehend criminals—they
were required to keep equipment handy for the job.170 Upon hearing the hue,
all were required to come forth with weapons.171 A 1285 statute required the
King’s wealthier subjects to keep items such as a “Hauberke, [a Breastplate]
of Iron, a Sword, a Knife, and an Horse.”172 In general, the rule was that

163. That is often just what the doctrine requires. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes put
it, “if a thing has been practised for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a
strong case” to challenge it. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922). Of course,
Justice Holmes also wrote that it would be “revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.” O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
164. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17 (1991); see also id. at 24
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing for the relevance of “the traditional practice
of American courts”).
165. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 582 (1898).
166. Id. at 578.
167. Id. Not only that, of course, but he also would likely “lay[] himself open to ugly
suspicions.” Id. The proper cry seems to have been “Out! Out!” or possibly “Haro” (“Hither”).
Id. at 578–79 & 579 n.1.
168. Id. at 578. Pollock and Maitland describe it as an “amerciable” offense, id., which
means one carrying a financial penalty, see Amerce, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
169. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 165, at 579.
170. Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 164 N.E. 726, 727 (N.Y. 1928) (describing how in
early English law, men were requested to maintain “instruments sufficient for the task”).
171. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 165, at 579 (noting that people were required at
the raising of the hue to “turn out with the bows, arrows, [and] knives that they [were] bound
to keep”).
172. Statute of Winchester 1285, 13 Edw. 1 c. 4–6 (Eng.) (alteration in original). A hauberk
is a sort of armor—think Conan the Barbarian. See, e.g., Conan Props., Inc. v. Mattel, Inc.,
712 F. Supp. 353, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (describing Conan’s attire as including a “hauberk [of]
leather and mail mesh”).
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“felons ought to be summarily arrested and put in gaol,” and all “true men
ought to take part in this work and are punishable if they neglect it.”173
This principle of mandatory public assistance in law enforcement was
transmitted to the American colonies and survived into the seventeenth
century even as law enforcement started to become more professionalized.
In 1641, Massachusetts enacted a law providing that “all Hue & cries shall
be duly received and diligently pursued to full effect,”174 and a few years
later, provided that anyone who “wilfully, obstinately or contemptuously
refuse[d] or neglect[ed] to assist any Constable” would be fined forty
shillings.175 Connecticut enacted a similar law in 1650.176 Although these
laws differed from their Edwardian antecedents by contemplating the
existence of a constabulary (and affording more process to anyone
apprehended),177 the fundamental principle was the same: ordinary people
were required to assist with law enforcement when commanded to do so.
The revolutionary-era controversy over the customs writs of assistance
also illustrates this principle.178 In 1767, England directed American
admiralty judges to issue writs “to authorize and impower the Officers of his
Majesty’s Customs” to “enter and go into” any place to “search for and seize
prohibited or uncustomed Goods.”179 This was the customs writ of
assistance, which got its name from the fact that it ordered a “wide variety of
persons to help”—that is, assist—“the customs man make his search.”180
Local officers, yes, but also “all manner of functionaries and private folk

173. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 165, at 582. Note that there was a species of strict
liability attached to this process—Pollock and Maitland doubt that “a charge of false
imprisonment could have been met by an allegation that there was reasonable cause for
suspicion,” such that the “ordinary man seems to have been expected to be very active in the
pursuit of malefactors and yet to ‘act at his peril.’” Id. at 582–83.
174. THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWES AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF
MASSACHUSETTS 13 (1648). For a very good discussion of this early history, to which I am
indebted for many of the original sources cited here, see Jon C. Blue, High Noon Revisited:
Commands of Assistance by Peace Officers in the Age of the Fourth Amendment, 101 YALE
L.J. 1475, 1479–82 (1992).
175. THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWES AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF
MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 174, at 13. In order for everyone to know who exactly they had
to obey, the law required that every constable carry “a black staffe of five foot long, tipped at
the upper end, about five inches with brasse, as a badge of his office, which he shal take with
him when he goeth to discharge any part of his office.” Id.
176. J. HAMMOND TRUMBULL, THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 522
(1850); see also Blue, supra note 174, at 1482.
177. The original hue and cry offered rather “barbaric justice.” POLLOCK & MAITLAND,
supra note 165, at 579. In some “sea-port towns,” the criminal might be “tied to a stake below
high-water mark and left to drown.” Id. at 496 n.7. And process was often summary, especially
if the felon was caught red-handed. See id. at 579–80.
178. See generally SMITH, supra note 51.
179. Id. at 1. “In 1766, the authorities in London concluded that the statutory authority for
the use of the writ in the American colonies was inadequate, so Parliament reauthorized use
of the writ in the Townshend Act of 1767.” Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 566 n.26 (1999) (citing Townshend Act 1767, 7 Geo. 3 c.
46, § 10 (Eng.)).
180. SMITH, supra note 51, at 29.
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besides.”181 But although the customs writ of assistance caused an enormous
controversy, especially in Boston, it was not its third-party assistance
requirement that did so. Rather, the objection was to the fact that the writs
permitted searches without a showing of individualized suspicion.182 That
is, it was the absence of cause that was a problem, not the fact that it
contemplated the assistance of private people. The idea that a private person
could be dragooned into law enforcement was normal and by then, centuries
old.183
The principle of private assistance for the public good was sufficiently
embedded in early American society such that it survived even the
Revolution, the ratification of the Fourth Amendment, and similar provisions
in the constitutions of the new states. An 1813 New York case, Coyles v.
Hurtin,184 is illustrative. The sheriff in Coyles went to a house with a warrant
to arrest several of the occupants but was resisted and outnumbered.185 The
men were “collected in a room above stairs, making a great noise, and
threatened to sacrifice any person who should come up.”186 When the sheriff
asked the owner of the house to go to the room and convince the men to give
themselves up, he replied that he would not do so “for a thousand dollars”;
nor would he give “the names of the persons collected in the room up
stairs.”187 Instead, the owner of the house welcomed the sheriff to “do his
duty,” and promised that he would not interfere, but did nothing more.188
Understandably reluctant to try and apprehend several rowdy laborers on his
own, the sheriff ordered the owner of the house (along with three other men)
to stand guard while he went to get help, and to “prevent the escape of the
men.”189 The men eventually escaped while the sheriff was gone, and the

181. Id. As Smith notes, requiring such assistance was “not new,” as “[c]ommunal
responsibility for maintenance of the public peace went back long before the Norman
Conquest” in the eleventh century. Id.
182. See O.M. Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40, 43–44 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1939). The customs writ of
assistance was also controversial in Boston for other reasons. Charles Paxton, the government
official at the center of the Boston writs-of-assistance controversy, was described by Sam
Adams as “the most insincere, plausible, and insinuating of mankind.” 1 THE WRITINGS OF
SAMUEL ADAMS 1764–1769, at 259–64 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., 1904); see also SMITH,
supra note 51, at 101 (discussing Adams’s remark, as well as Paxton’s epithet as “every man’s
humble servant, but no man’s friend,” and concluding that there were “few figures in the
revolutionary period” who could have had a worse public image).
183. But see Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of
Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 77–78 (1996) (describing this assistance power as
having added “a vague and possibly tyrannical new layer of bodily intrusion and unchecked
discretion into the system”). It may well seem that way to us. But as the text indicates, this
layer of intrusion, tyrannical and vague though it may have been, was not as new as Professor
Amar suggests.
184. 10 Johns. 85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813).
185. Id. at 85. The objects of the arrest warrant had apparently “taken refuge” in a house
near the evocatively named “Drowned Lands” and were “determined to resist, by force, the
execution of the warrant.” Id.
186. Id. at 86.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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sheriff arrested the owner of the house for not being helpful enough, for
which the owner sued the sheriff for assault and battery and false
imprisonment.190 The owner won the lawsuit, but was reversed on appeal,191
with the reversing court holding that “[e]very man is bound to be aiding and
assisting, upon order or summons, in preserving the peace and apprehending
offenders, and is punishable, if he refuses.”192
Coyles is representative of the early American tradition requiring private
people to assist the government with law enforcement when commanded.193
That tradition continued into the nineteenth century where, for example,
public regulation of slavery in the American South required even those who
did not own slaves to join so-called “slave patrols”—groups charged with
enforcing slave laws.194 These patrols were explicitly modeled on the
tradition of “the ‘hue and cry’ that a constable would bellow in the wake of
elusive criminals,” and were a direct descendent of “the posse comitatus, the
bands of men called out in early modern England to chase down and arrest
fleeing felons.”195 In 1845, the governor of South Carolina explained to a
leading English abolitionist that “[w]ith us, every citizen is concerned in the
maintenance of order” among what he called “the lowest class who are our
slaves.”196
Summarizing the doctrine in the early part of the twentieth century,
Benjamin Cardozo, then Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, put
it this way: “Still, as in the days of Edward I, the citizenry may be called
upon to enforce the justice of the State, not faintly and with lagging steps, but
honestly and bravely and with whatever implements and facilities are
convenient and at hand.”197 Even today, most states continue to authorize
police officers to demand the assistance of bystanders as they carry out their

190. Id. at 85–86.
191. Id. at 87, 89.
192. Id. at 88.
193. Until the nineteenth century, the power to compel private citizens to assist with
enforcement of the law was often thought to be reserved to state and local governments. See
Gautham Rao, The Federal Posse Comitatus Doctrine: Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft
in Mid-Nineteenth-Century America, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 15–19 (2008). Though the
“principle of compulsory service” was “deeply embedded in the fabric of state and local
governance,” it was “almost altogether lacking at the federal level.” Id. at 15. As with many
features of the federal-state relationship, however, there was a profound alteration in this
understanding after the Civil War, which is discussed further below. See infra notes 197–215
and accompanying text.
194. SALLY E. HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS: LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND THE
CAROLINAS 1–2 (2001).
195. Id. at 3; see also supra notes 165–73. What made slave patrols distinct in America
was their “reliance upon race as a defining feature”; although the patrols included non-slaveowners, they “did not include free blacks,” a “singular difference that set slave patrols apart.”
HADDEN, supra note 194, at 2, 4.
196. Slavery at the South, 7 DEBOW’S REV. 289, 296 (1849).
197. Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 164 N.E. 726, 727 (N.Y. 1928). Babington was a
chauffeur, who was in his car when a police officer “jumped on the running board [of his car]
and ordered [him] to chase another car in order to arrest its occupant.” Id. at 726. Suddenly,
another vehicle cut across Babington’s path, which caused an accident killing Babington. Id.
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duties.198 In New York, it is a crime to unreasonably refuse aid to a police
officer in effecting an arrest or preventing the commission of a crime.199
In United States v. New York Telephone Co.,200 the Supreme Court
considered the government’s power to compel assistance in the installation
of pen registers, devices attached to a telephone line that recorded numbers
dialed.201 In the 1970s, unlike today, no law explicitly required telephone
companies to assist in the installation of such devices.202 Lower courts had
split on the question of whether such assistance was therefore required.203 In
its brief to the Supreme Court, New York Telephone Co. made arguments
much like the ones made by network service providers today.204 “[O]utside
of Title III,” the company argued, there is “no express statutory authority
which provides that unwilling third parties, such as Respondent, may be
directed to affirmatively assist law enforcement in effecting a pen register
interception.”205 “The most disturbing aspect of the Government’s position,”
the company continued, was its claim that courts “can, without statutory
specification, direct orders to private citizens to participate in law
enforcement without the extent of such power being spelled out in clearly

198. See Blue, supra note 174, at 1475 n.2, 1476 n.3 (collecting statutes). Some states
authorize the officer to make the command but do not apparently criminalize the refusal; others
do, with varying punishments. Id.
199. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.10 (McKinney 2018). The practice commentary suggests that
this is only a crime if it is possible to safely assist, but cites nothing in support of this
proposition. See id. § 195.10 note (McKinney 2010) (William C. Donnino, Practice
Commentary). At any rate, it is difficult to imagine how it could ever be genuinely safe to
help a police officer arrest someone.
200. 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
201. Id. at 161 & n.1; see also United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 549 n.1 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that such devices do not “involve
any monitoring of telephone conversations”); United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033,
1038 n.1 (D. Md. 1972) (describing a pen register as a device that, at least in 1972, “record[ed]
on a paper tape dashes equal in number to the number dialed” (quoting United States v. Caplan,
255 F. Supp. 805, 807 (E.D. Mich. 1966))).
202. As discussed at greater length below, for a wiretap, there was an explicit statutory duty
to assist. See supra notes 225–64, 292 and accompanying text. But a pen register is not a
wiretap. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2012) (defining a wiretap intercept as “the aural or other
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of
any electronic, mechanical, or other device” (emphasis added)). Therefore, the installation of
a pen register was not subject to the statute requiring assistance in the “interception of any
wire, oral, or electronic communication.” Id. § 2518(4).
203. The Seventh Circuit found it “more congruent with both reason and Congressional
intent to have courts, rather than the telephone company, decide if a pen register should or
should not be used,” and so thought that the “authority to compel the cooperation of the
telephone company [was] in a sense concomitant of the power to authorize the installation of
a pen register, for without the former the latter would be worthless.” United States v. Ill. Bell
Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 814 (7th Cir. 1976). The Second Circuit (in a similar case) concluded
that a district court’s command of assistance represented an abuse of discretion: absent
explicit “Congressional authority, such an order could establish a most undesirable, if not
dangerous and unwise, precedent for the authority of federal courts to impress unwilling aid
on private third parties.” In re United States, 538 F.2d 956, 962 (2d Cir. 1976).
204. See generally Brief for New York Telephone Co., N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (No.
76-835), 1977 WL 189311.
205. Id. at 25.
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defined statutes.”206 “It is one thing,” in other words, “for courts to act to
prevent an obstruction of their orders; it is quite another to dragoon unwilling
private parties into affirmative participation.”207
But the phone company lost.208 It was a close decision—five to four—but
in the end, the government proved that it did not need specific statutory
authorization to compel private companies to aid it in surveillance.209 Rather,
the assistance order was “clearly authorized by the All Writs Act.”210 In
dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that if “the All Writs Act confers
authority to order persons to aid the Government in the performance of its
duties,” then it “provides a sweeping grant of authority entirely without
precedent in our Nation’s history.”211 But that is just the problem: such
dragooned assistance is historically normal, and presents serious doctrinal
risks to the ex post resistance strategy to these new writs of assistance.
Today, the government’s use of the All Writs Act to compel third-party aid
is very common.212 The government recently disclosed that it has used the
Act to order the unlocking of Apple phones alone “at least” seventy times
since 2008.213 That is not to say that this use has gone unquestioned:
Magistrate Judge James Orenstein explicitly raised separation-of-powers
concerns about the government’s use of the Act in a 2016 Brooklyn hearing
in a drug case, and eventually ruled against the government.214 But the broad
trend toward government surveillance is quite clear, and it is consistent with
the historical evidence laid out above.215
To be sure, there are doctrinal limits on the responsibilities of third parties
to assist law enforcement—though the present contours of those limits are
imprecise and fact dependent. The Supreme Court held in New York
Telephone Co. that courts may only compel third-party assistance under the
All Writs Act in “appropriate circumstances,” such as where a third party is
not too far “removed from the underlying controversy,” and where an order
of assistance is not too “burdensome.”216 Similarly vague bounds exist on

206. Id. at 34.
207. Id.
208. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 176–78.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 172.
211. Id. at 190 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
212. The ACLU has constructed a map detailing modern cases involving the Act and cell
phones, and it has counted sixty-three confirmed cases as of 2016. Eliza Sweren-Becker, This
Map Shows How the Apple-FBI Fight Was About Much More Than One Phone, ACLU (Mar.
30, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/map-shows-how-apple-fbi-fightwas-about-much-more-one-phone [https://perma.cc/FAW5-RLU5].
213. Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Feds Say Apple Has Unlocked Suspects’ iPhones ‘At
Least’ 70 Times in the Past, MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 26, 2015, 5:00 PM), https://motherboard.
vice.com/en_us/article/4xagvq/feds-say-apple-has-unlocked-suspects-iphones-at-least-70times-in-the-past [https://perma.cc/V2UW-C3FK].
214. In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 361–63, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
215. See supra Part I.B.
216. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174–75 (majority opinion). The opinion by Justice White
is a bit of a hash: it does not say, or attempt to, which of the many “facts of this case” are the
crucial ones. For instance, the Court’s opinion observes that New York Telephone Co. was a
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subpoenas and other means of compelled private assistance. It is therefore
plausible to imagine courts sustaining objections to the new writs of
assistance (or at least the most radical of them) on doctrinal grounds, and the
briefs of network service providers have generally called for exactly that.217
But such arguments must grapple with the formidable historical precedents
discussed above.218
Doctrine can also change, which might be appropriate precisely because
these new writs of assistance are new: they call for forms of assistance
previously unheard of or, at minimum, for the collection of information that
has never before existed. In these circumstances, doctrinal change may well
be required. The Supreme Court held in Kyllo v. United States,219 for
example, that the Fourth Amendment should be construed to ensure at least
“that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.”220 Thus, the Fourth Amendment regards as a
“search” not just physical intrusions into the home, but even the “obtaining
by sense-enhancing technology [of] any information regarding the interior of
the home that could not otherwise have been obtained.”221 If the new writs
of assistance diminish individual privacy, and current doctrine does not
proscribe such diminishment, then one available argument is that cases like
Kyllo require the current doctrine to change. Doctrinal response and
adjustment to technological change is part of American legal doctrine (at
least in the Fourth Amendment).222 And, apart from the technological issues
at play in this Article, the general presumption in favor of third-party
assistance has also been questioned on doctrinal grounds.223 At least one
scholar has argued that the Constitution should be understood to place
important limits on commands of assistance.224
“highly regulated public utility with a duty to serve the public.” Id. Is that important, or simply
a helpful atmospheric fact? The Court does not say.
217. See, e.g., Apple, Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist
Agents in Search, and Opposition to Government’s Motion to Compel Assistance, In re Search
of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant, No. CM-16-10 (E.D.
Cal. Feb. 25, 2016), ECF No. 16. This brief argues that the All Writs Act does not confer the
authority to compel Apple’s assistance, id. at 15–19, that New York Telephone Co. is not to
the contrary, id. at 20, and (more esoterically) that compelled assistance in these circumstances
would violate the First and Fifth Amendments, id. at 32–34.
218. See supra Part II.B.
219. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
220. Id. at 34. At issue in Kyllo was the use of “a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private
home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home.” Id. at 29. The
question presented was whether this was a search of the home under the Fourth Amendment.
Id. The Court held that it was. Id. at 40.
221. Id. at 34.
222. It is equally true, though, that the “law, though jealous of individual privacy,” has not
always “kept pace with . . . advances in scientific knowledge.” Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41, 49 (1967); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (concluding that
government wiretaps were not searches for purposes of the Fourth Amendment because they
are accomplished without physically intruding into the home), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
223. See generally Blue, supra note 174.
224. Id. at 1484–86. Judge Jon C. Blue argues that the Fourth Amendment is implicated
wherever “an officer by a show of authority ‘has in some way restrained the liberty of a
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Nonetheless, the doctrinal obstacles for ex post resistance are formidable.
Even absent specific legislative authorization, for centuries courts have
generally been willing to force third parties to assist the government in law
enforcement and surveillance. Therefore, even if the legislature does not act
to expand the government’s powers, existing doctrine is likely more than
enough to help the government learn everything it needs.
C. Executive Circumvention of Surveillance Limitations
Even if legislatures and courts purport to constrain the executive’s power
to access information stored on networked devices and services, there is still
a final danger: that the government may attempt to acquire information from
network intermediaries without court approval and in contravention of
statutory authority. Historically, this is not in any sense farfetched. This does
not necessarily require the government to knowingly break the law in the
ordinary sense although there are ample instances where that occurs. What
it requires is some combination of (1) a generous view of the government’s
inherent powers to conduct necessary surveillance; (2) a narrow view of
restrictions on those powers; and (3) as much secrecy, and as little court
involvement, as possible to ensure that those generous and narrow views are
not subject to public or coordinate-branch oversight. This Part details this
phenomenon.
At least as far back as Franklin Roosevelt, presidents have asserted the
ability to engage in surveillance beyond what courts and legislatures have
authorized them to engage in—and even in contravention of their
proscriptions. When Roosevelt became president, Olmstead was the law of
the land, and wiretapping was unregulated for Fourth Amendment purposes.
But Olmstead had also drawn considerable negative public attention,225 and
almost immediately after it was decided, members of Congress began to
introduce legislation to curb wiretapping.226 Congress first prohibited the
citizen.’” Id. at 1485 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)). The implications
of that rule, Judge Blue argues, are “reasonably clear” for “commands of assistance.” Id. A
person given such a command has been seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, and that
seizure must be reasonable—an unlikely proposal when an “attempt by an unarmed civilian to
apprehend a suspected criminal” is, in many circumstances, “a form of Russian roulette.” Id.
at 1486.
225. See Neal Katyal & Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality
of the NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1036 (2008).
Katyal and Caplan quote a representative New York Times editorial: “Prohibition, having bred
crimes innumerable, has succeeded in making the Government the instigator, abettor and
accomplice of crime. It has now made universal snooping possible.” Id. (quoting Editorial,
Government Lawbreaking, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1928, at 24). Katyal and Caplan, supra,
discuss many of the historical materials cited here at greater length, and I commend their
account of the Roosevelt-era materials to interested readers.
226. 74 CONG. REC. 3, 2901–02 (1931); see also Katyal & Caplan, supra note 225, at 1036–
37 (briefly detailing some congressional debates on the subject). There was not much need
for such legislation initially because the Justice Department insisted that it did not engage in
wiretapping—J. Edgar Hoover, at least, publicly insisted as much. 74 CONG. REC. 2901–02
(1931). The head of the Prohibition Bureau at the time, Amos Woodcock, had no such qualms,
however; when asked if he engaged in wiretapping, Woodcock said, “We do; and the Supreme
Court has approved that practice.” WALTER F. MURPHY, WIRETAPPING ON TRIAL: A CASE
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use of appropriated funds for wiretaps by the Prohibition Bureau,227 and soon
after, enacted the Communications Act of 1934,228 which forbade
interception of any “interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio.”229
Although the Roosevelt administration argued that the Communications Act
did not forbid wiretapping,230 the Supreme Court rejected that reading by
concluding that “the plain words of [section] 605 forbid anyone, unless
authorized by the sender, to intercept a telephone message.”231 The
government initially complied with the Court’s ruling, although not without
some reluctance.232 And after a few more decisions on the Act’s scope, thenAttorney General Robert Jackson announced that he understood the Congress
and the Supreme Court to have forbidden the practice of wiretapping
altogether.233
J. Edgar Hoover, then the director of the FBI, strongly disagreed with
Jackson’s conclusions,234 and he told President Roosevelt that he
“desperately” needed wiretapping authority to engage in surveillance of
suspected Nazi spies.235 Roosevelt then authorized the surveillance in a
STUDY IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 128 (1965); see also Katyal & Caplan, supra note 225, at
1036–37 (canvassing this history). Woodcock evidently came to change his mind about
wiretapping, or so reported at least one St. Louis newspaper editorial noted in the
Congressional Record. 75 CONG. REC. 4733 (1932).
227. Pub. L. No. 72-387, tit. II, 47 Stat. 1371, 1381 (1933). Congress appropriated
$8,440,000 in all to the Prohibition Bureau, provided that “no part of this appropriation
[would] be used for or in connection with ‘wire tapping’ to procure evidence of violations of
the National Prohibition Act.” Id. The appropriation also banned the use of these funds for
“the purchase of intoxicating liquors which are consumed by the investigator or anyone with
him,” id., an intriguing proviso that is, unfortunately, well beyond the scope of this Article.
228. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–162 (2012)).
229. Id. § 605, 48 Stat. at 1103.
230. JOSEPH E. PERSICO, ROOSEVELT’S SECRET WAR 35 (2001). Katyal and Caplan
elliptically criticize this reading as one arrived at “[d]espite the Act’s text.” See Katyal &
Caplan, supra note 225, at 1038. I am more sympathetic to it, at least as an initial textual
matter: the section is titled “Unauthorized Publication of Communications,” for one thing.
§ 605, 48 Stat. at 1103 (emphasis added). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court concluded
otherwise, see Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382–83 (1937), and that is what matters
for purposes of the argument here.
231. Nardone, 302 U.S. at 382. The case concerned (what else?) bootlegging, specifically,
a plan to smuggle about 1600 cases of liquor into the Port of New York. United States v.
Nardone, 90 F.2d 630, 630–31 (2d Cir. 1937) (Hand, J.), rev’d, 302 U.S. 379. The Supreme
Court reasoned that “Congress may have thought it less important that some offenders should
go unwhipped of justice than that officers should resort to methods deemed inconsistent with
ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty.” Nardone, 302 U.S. at 383. The Supreme
Court weighed in twice more on the scope of the 1934 Act: first, to confirm that the
government could not make derivative use of the substance of the recorded calls, Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939); and second, to hold that the Act banned wiretapping
of intrastate, as well as interstate, calls, Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 329 (1939).
232. The day after the decision, the New York Times quoted anonymous Justice Department
officials suggesting that the Court’s opinion (when read carefully) did not, in fact, prohibit
wiretapping. High Court Bars Testimony Based on Wire-Tapping, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1937,
at 1. The Times reported that there was “a question in the minds of some Department of Justice
officials whether listening in on telephone conversations was not still permissible.” Id.
233. See CURT GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS 231 (1991).
234. See id. (discussing Hoover’s leaks to the press about the ways in which Jackson’s ban
was harming investigations).
235. Katyal & Caplan, supra note 225, at 1050 (quoting PERSICO, supra note 230, at 35).
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memorandum stating that he was “convinced” that the Court’s decisions
interpreting the 1934 prohibition did not apply “to grave matters involving
the defense of the nation,”236 and accordingly approved wiretaps of “persons
suspected of subversive activities against the Government of the United
States.”237 Roosevelt phrased his analysis as consistent with Supreme Court
precedent, and so retained a fig leaf of legality. The memorandum’s analysis
was “to put it mildly, weak,”238 but that did not matter as the memorandum
was also secret.239
The scope of the wiretapping was not confined, in practice, to the sorts of
Nazi saboteur situations that might have been at the forefront of Roosevelt’s
mind: Jackson admitted that he had authorized it in a case involving a routine
domestic kidnapping.240 Hoover wanted to, and did, spy on labor
organizations.241 One newspaper columnist was suspected of a “most subtle
type of espionage activity” against the United States, and wiretapped on that
basis.242 Though the investigation turned up no such evidence, it did reveal
that the columnist was engaged in an affair with a young John F. Kennedy,
evidence that remained in Hoover’s files until his death.243
The decades after World War II saw further abuses. From the 1950s to the
1970s, the CIA secretly intercepted, opened, and read postal mail without a
warrant (ostensibly to gather foreign intelligence),244 despite this being
236. Id. (quoting Memorandum from President Franklin Roosevelt to Attorney Gen. Robert
H. Jackson (May 21, 1940) (on file with the Library of Congress, Robert H. Jackson Papers,
Box 94, Folder 6)).
237. Id. at 1025 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 7).
238. Id. at 1050.
239. Id.; see also id. at 1051 (“There was no wiggle room in the Court’s opinions, as
members of FDR’s Administration themselves told Congress when they sought changes to the
1934 Act in the wake of Nardone I and II. But FDR got away with his legal maneuvering
because, after all, his memo was secret.”).
240. To Authorize Wire Tapping: Hearings on H.R. 2266 and H.R. 3099 Before Subcomm.
No. 1 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. 17, 19 (1941) (printing letters from Hon.
Robert H. Jackson, United States Attorney General, regarding H.R. 2266 and 3099).
241. FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER 187–93 (Athan Theoharis ed., 1991).
As Katyal and Caplan note, it is now “quite clear” that surveillance of labor and other affiliated
groups took place. Katyal & Caplan, supra note 225, at 1058. They included
wiretaps of organizations and businesses as varied as the NAACP, Kyffhaeuser
Bund, and the Revolutionary Workers League. In addition, many unions were
surveilled, including the CIO Maritime Committee, CIO Food, Tobacco,
Agricultural & Allied Workers of America, International Longshoremen’s and
Warehousemen’s Union (CIO), National Maritime Union, National Negro Labor
Council, National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards, United Electrical Radio
& Machine Workers of America, and the United Public Workers of America—CIO.
Id.
242. FROM THE SECRET FILES OF J. EDGAR HOOVER, supra note 241, at 15.
243. Id. at 15–16; Katyal & Caplan, supra note 225, at 1059; see also Athan Theoharis,
FBI Wiretapping: A Case Study of Bureaucratic Autonomy, 107 POL. SCI. Q. 101, 111 (1992)
(detailing Roosevelt’s somewhat bizarre personal involvement in this particular incident).
244. See David Wise, The CIA Burglar Who Went Rogue, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct. 2012),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-cia-burglar-who-went-rogue-36739394/
[https://perma.cc/B4DG-SC8A] (“[T]he CIA screened more than 28 million first-class letters
and opened 215,000 of them between 1953 and 1973, even though . . . the Fourth Amendment
bars third parties from opening first-class mail without a warrant.”).
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firmly established as illegal for nearly a century.245 Just as before, the
investigations soon went beyond that purpose, and eventually the CIA began
reading mail to or from figures such as Hubert Humphrey, John Steinbeck,
and Martin Luther King.246 Other similar intelligence abuses eventually led
to the creation of the Senate Select Committee to Study Government
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities247—popularly known as
the “Church Committee,” after its chair.248 Senator Church summarized his
fears in a 1975 episode of Meet the Press:
If this government ever became a tyranny, if a dictator ever took charge
in this country, the technological capacity that the intelligence community
has given the government could enable it to impose total tyranny, and there
would be no way to fight back because the most careful effort to combine
together in resistance to the government, no matter how privately it was
done, is within the reach of the government to know.249

Church feared a one-way ratchet: past a certain point, there is a degree of
government surveillance that begins to operate on the norms of democracy
itself.250
More recently, the Bush administration authorized the National Security
Agency to intercept communications into and out of the United States when
the agency believed that at least one party was a member of Al Qaeda or a
related terrorist organization.251 These interceptions were carried out without
245. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (“The constitutional guaranty of the right
of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends
to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they
can only be opened and examined under like warrant.”); see also United States v. Van
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251 (1970) (“It has long been held that first-class mail such as letters
and sealed packages subject to letter postage—as distinguished from newspapers, magazines,
pamphlets, and other printed matter—is free from inspection by postal authorities, except in
the manner provided by the Fourth Amendment.”).
246. MICHAEL HOLZMAN, JAMES JESUS ANGLETON, THE CIA, AND THE CRAFT OF
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 171–72 (2008). The justification for this program was so perverse as
to be almost admirable: “precisely because the enemy regarded America’s mails as inviolate,”
inspection of the mail was thought “likely to provide clues to the identities of Soviet agents.”
Id. at 172 (emphasis omitted) (quoting MARK RIEBLING, WEDGE 148 (1994)). The program
was justified along the same lines Roosevelt envisioned: surely, “any restrictions on
government mail-opening must . . . have read into them an exception that would allow CIA to
cover mail in time of secret war.” Id. (quoting RIEBLING, supra, at 148).
247. See S. REP. NO. 94-755, at III (1976).
248. See, e.g., Church Committee Created, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artand
history/history/minute/Church_Committee_Created.htm [https://perma.cc/UE2P-5C9P] (last
visited Apr. 13, 2018) (describing the creation of the Committee on January 27, 1975).
249. NBCUniversal
Archives,
The
Intelligence
Gathering
Debate—
www.NBCUniversalArchives.com, YOUTUBE (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=YAG1N4a84Dk [https://perma.cc/ME7L-FSZH] (showing an excerpt of a Meet the
Press episode from August 17, 1975).
250. This is also essentially the fear of Professor Cohen. See Cohen, supra note 13, at 1912
(“Under such conditions, liberal democracy as a form of government is replaced, gradually
but surely, by a different form of government that I will call modulated democracy because it
relies on a form of surveillance that operates by modulation.”).
251. See generally OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., REPORT NO. 2009-0013-AS,
UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM (2009). What exactly to
call this program is a politically charged question. The Bush administration referred to it
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any court authorization, simply done on the President’s say-so.252 Nor were
they authorized by any legislation, instead being reauthorized by the
President every forty-five days.253 The Bush administration officials who
implemented this surveillance program did not regard themselves as acting
extralegally—just as Roosevelt had not. But, just as with Roosevelt, it is hard
to conclude that the bulk interception of telecommunications without a
warrant was anything other than a flagrant violation of both judicial doctrine
and legislative command—or so the vast majority of commentators, on the
left and the right, concluded.254 Even the program’s internal constraints were
controversial and prompted near-resignation of nearly the entire senior
leadership of the Justice Department.255
When Congress legislatively authorized the Bush-era surveillance
(consistent, note, with the argument that the legislature is generally a willing
partner in government collection of private information), the government
interpreted the authority incredibly broadly—again, in secret. Section 702 of
the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 authorized electronic surveillance of
“persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.”256 The
executive branch interpreted that authority to permit acquisition of
communications about people who were outside the United States, not just to
or from them,257 and of anyone who was not affirmatively known to be inside
publicly as the “Terrorist Surveillance Program.” Id. at 1, 6. The legislation passed in 2008 to
address the program refers to it as “the intelligence activity involving communications that
was authorized by the President during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, and
ending on January 17, 2007, including the program referred to by the President in a radio
address on December 17, 2005.” FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261,
§ 301(a)(3), 122 Stat. 2436, 2471 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 50 U.S.C.).
David Addington (a prominent administration lawyer and close aide to Vice President Cheney)
apparently referred to it simply as “the president’s program.” BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER:
THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY 280 (2008).
252. The government acknowledged as much. See OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., supra note
251, at 6 (“[T]he President and other Administration officials acknowledged that these
activities included the interception without a court order.”); see also James Risen & Eric
Lichtblau, Spying Program Snared U.S. Calls, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/21/politics/spying-program-snared-us-calls.html
[https://perma.cc/ST2W-JVP3] (describing the program as one “approved by President Bush
to conduct eavesdropping without warrants”).
253. OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GEN., supra note 251, at 6 (“The Presidential Authorizations
were issued at intervals of approximately every 45 days.”).
254. See John Yoo, The Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Constitution, 14 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 565, 567 (2007) (“Fire rained down not only from the left, but also from the
right.”).
255. Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Department of Justice Politicizing the
Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?—Part IV: Hearing of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 218–21 (2007) (statement of James B. Comey, former Deputy U.S. Attorney
General, Department of Justice) (testifying that at least a large segment of the senior leadership
of the Department of Justice, including then-FBI Director (Robert Mueller III) and Attorney
General (John Ashcroft) had at the time contemplated resigning because the President was not
obeying legal restrictions on the program).
256. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012).
257. Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and
Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 158 (2015) (describing how the National
Security Agency adopted “procedures that allow analysts to acquire information ‘about’
selectors (that is, communications modes used by targets) or targets, and not merely
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the United States—with no duty to investigate whether they were or not.258
The result was “widespread” interception of communications made by
Americans,259 along with public misrepresentations to the Supreme Court
about how the government was implementing the program.260
The government might well attempt to get private user data information
from network intermediaries absent legislative authorization or court order.
A cooperative intermediary might gladly go along.261 But even an
uncooperative intermediary might find its cooperation ordered, in secret,
without any practical method to challenge it in court, or its user data simply
intercepted at some other point on the internet as it is transmitted. This would
pose certain technical challenges, the most important of which would be the
acquisition of the intermediary’s private encryption keys. It is the
government’s view, however, that it can demand those keys with a subpoena
or the Stored Communications Act, which, as discussed above,262 do not
require a warrant or probable cause.263
This sort of executive legality risk should be the final nail in the coffin for
an ex post resistance strategy. Even if courts protect our data under current
law and legislatures back them up, that is no guarantee that a motivated
member of the executive branch at whatever level will not simply go and get
the information it wants anyway, however it can.
The above summarizes risks. Its pessimistic account is one of what could
happen if network intermediaries continue to collect large amounts of private
communications to or from targets (or selectors employed by targets), or information held by
targets themselves”).
258. Id. (describing the government’s “presumption of non-U.S. person status”).
259. See Hon. Sandra L. Lynch, Constitutional Integrity: Lessons from the Shadows, 92
N.Y.U. L. REV. 623, 625 (2017); see also Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Ex-Worker
at C.I.A. Says He Leaked Data on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/us/former-cia-worker-says-he-leaked-surveillancedata.html [https://perma.cc/QDP5-Z4AE] (noting that “the Justice Department had secretly
obtained phone logs for reporters at The Associated Press and Fox News”).
260. Lynch, supra note 259, at 626 (noting that “the Solicitor General had represented to
the [Supreme] Court, believing it to be true, that the government had given notices to criminal
defendants where warrantless surveillance had been the source of evidence against them,”
which was not true).
261. As “far back as World War II,” the National Security Agency has “had classified
relationships with carefully vetted U.S. companies that assist with essential foreign
intelligence-gathering activities.” Office of Inspector Gen., Report No. ST-09-0002, Working
Draft 28 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.aclu.org/files/natsec/nsa/2013
0816/NSA%20IG%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VMP-LJZ8]. After the September 11
attacks, two telecommunications companies (widely believed to be Verizon and AT&T)
“contacted [the] NSA and asked, ‘What can we do to help?’” Declan McCullagh, Surveillance
‘Partnership’ Between NSA and Telcos Points to AT&T, Verizon, CNET (June 27, 2013, 2:40
PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/surveillance-partnership-between-nsa-and-telcos-points-toat-t-verizon/ [https://perma.cc/979H-RPKY].
262. See supra Part II.A.
263. See, e.g., United States v. Lavabit, LLC, 749 F.3d 276, 282–83 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he
Government obtained a seizure warrant from the district court under the Stored
Communications Act . . . . The seizure warrant provided that Lavabit was to turn over ‘[a]ll
information necessary to decrypt communications sent to or from [the target’s] Lavabit email
account . . . , including encryption keys and SSL keys.’” (third, fourth, and fifth alterations in
original) (citation omitted)).
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data about private people—the risks we run if we persist on the current path.
Of course, these risks might not come to pass. Courts might read the
government’s existing authority narrowly, legislatures might deny the
government any further authority, and the executive might obey those
directions. That would be a good result, and there is nothing wrong with
pursuing that strategy even while one understands it may fail.
But the risks of error in this situation are not symmetric. If network
intermediaries continue to stockpile private data and successfully resist
government demands for aid that would be socially harmful, we will enjoy
modest but certain benefits: our location will be used by our devices to
enhance restaurant recommendations, our in-home always-on speakers will
play music at our spoken command, and our search results will be more
personalized for us. But if they do not succeed in this strategy, the data will
have already been collected and it will be too late to do anything about it—
exposing us to stochastic and largely unbounded harms. Nassim Taleb has
called this property (benefits that are “small and visible,” with side effects
that are “potentially severe and invisible”) “fragility.”264 Ex post resistance
might work, but it is a very fragile strategy.
III. REGULATING PRIVATE SURVEILLANCE
This Part grapples with the possibility that the government might get
access to whatever network intermediaries can and do learn about us. Soon,
if we are not there already, those intermediaries will know essentially
everything. Call this the panoptic presumption. If it is accepted, not as a
normative argument but a descriptive reality, what would follow?265
This Part argues that this state of affairs increases the normative
desirability of regulating the information about us that can be collected and
retained by network intermediaries. Market forces cannot do the job because
the “market for privacy” has a number of well-understood failures—and
introducing government surveillance into the mix only magnifies those
failures. Instead, personal information should be treated as a potentially
harmful asset, the collection and retention of which should be regulated ex
ante.

264. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE: THINGS THAT GAIN FROM DISORDER 9–11
(2012).
265. Because of the nature of the argument in Part II, the panoptic presumption is not meant
to be taken as a literal prediction that the government will in fact acquire all of the information
held by network intermediaries. Different observers might have differing assessments of how
strong the presumption should be understood to be based on differing assessments of the
likelihood of what this Article calls “legality risk.” Whatever one’s assessment in this respect,
it would scale the need for the recommendations in Part III accordingly—that is, to whatever
extent one believes the panoptic presumption is a descriptively accurate consequence of the
new writs of assistance, it should follow that the solutions in Part III should be regarded as
necessary to the same extent.
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A. The Failures in the Market for Privacy
Why not just allow individual people to decide what they share with
network intermediaries, and take seriously the privacy consequences of those
voluntary choices?266 After all, as Jerry Kang has noted, one might
“reasonably view personal information as a valuable commodity that should
be exchanged on the free market.”267 And indeed, Stephanos Bibas has
argued that a “contractual approach” to data privacy is the right one, at least
in some circumstances.268
But a purely individual-choice model will not work because genuine
freedom of choice requires information and the power to choose.269 As to
the former, an enormous amount of information about people is gathered
without their knowledge, much less their consent.270 Further, people are
quite poor at assessing the harms that may result from even consensual
disclosure of their private data—it is hard to assess the harms it will lead to
in the future, and “the trivial and incremental character of each loss . . . tends
to minimize its ultimate effect.”271 This problem is especially severe when
it comes to evaluating secondary and tertiary consumers of personal
information.272 As to the existence of power to choose, as Paul Schwartz has
argued, surveillance itself can erode choice: “the more that is known about

266. Cf. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has
held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns
over to third parties.”). Such a person is said to have “assumed the risk” of disclosure, at least
for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 744. This “third-party doctrine” enjoys near-universal
contempt among criminal procedure scholars. See, e.g., 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.7(c) (4th ed. 2004) (stating that this
doctrine is “dead wrong”); Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the “Legitimate
Expectation of Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1315 (1981); Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a
Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 564–66 (1990).
267. Kang, supra note 13, at 1246. Kang is ultimately skeptical of this model, but he takes
it seriously on its own economic-efficiency terms. Id. at 1246–48.
268. See generally Steven A. Bibas, Note, A Contractual Approach to Data Privacy, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 591 (1994). Kang also surveys some of the other literature making
this point. See Kang, supra note 13, at 1247 n.234 (citing Scott Shorr, Note, Personal
Information Contracts: How to Protect Privacy Without Violating the First Amendment, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1756, 1818–46 (1995); Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, COMM.
ACM, Sept. 1996, at 92).
269. Cohen, supra note 71, at 1396 (noting that free choice requires “accurate information
about choices and their consequences” as well as “enough power—in terms of wealth,
numbers, or control over resources—to have choices”).
270. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 33 (2004); Kang, supra note 13, at 1199
(“The very technology that makes cyberspace possible also makes detailed, cumulative,
invisible observation of our selves possible.” (emphasis added)).
271. Cohen, supra note 71, at 1398; see also A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the
Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L.
& COMM. 395, 492 (1996) (“[A]s long as in each individual transaction the cost of not
providing the information is disproportionate to the loss (which is a function of the cumulation
of the transactions, not any single transaction), a property rights approach appears unlikely to
have much real influence on database creation.”).
272. Cohen, supra note 71, at 1396–97.
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an individual, the easier it is to force his obedience.”273 And even fully
informed and autonomous individuals have less power over the collection of
information about them than they think.274 Companies are generally free,
under American law, to collect information about people with whom they
have no contractual relationship, and use it for their own purposes.275
That is the standard answer—but the argument in Part II suggests a further
one. Even if individuals can master the privacy consequences of surrendering
their private information to companies, there are unique challenges to the
“consent” model when that private disclosure may result in government
surveillance. Government surveillance is often conducted in secret and
outside the ordinary court system;276 even when it is done as part of criminal
law enforcement, the user may have no way to know that his or her
information is being demanded or that it has been turned over. Indeed, the
user may not even have standing to object to the third party’s disclosure of
his or her information to the government.277 How is a person supposed to
meaningfully “consent” to a regime like that? If we must “consent” to the
possibility of secret government surveillance to use any network service, then
that consent in and of itself creates the harms described in Part I: an
uncertainty about whether we are ever being watched, and the accompanying
self-censorship and lack of breathing space for ordinary human flourishing.
For related reasons, it is not feasible to expect ordinary market competition
to solve the problems identified in Parts I and II. To be sure, conscientious
network service providers could voluntarily choose to learn less about their
users.278 Some companies do choose to gather as little user data as they can,
273. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public
Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 560 (1995); see also Kang, supra
note 13, at 1216.
274. In 2009, for example, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada released a
formal report about complaints that Facebook had violated Canada’s data-privacy laws. See
generally ELIZABETH DENHAM, REPORT OF FINDINGS INTO THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE
CANADIAN INTERNET POLICY AND PUBLIC INTEREST CLINIC (CIPPIC) AGAINST FACEBOOK INC.
UNDER THE PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION AND ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS ACT (2009),
https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/1033/2009_008_0716_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4HN-R8FC].
A substantial portion of those complaints were about the collection of information from nonFacebook users. Id. at 70–77.
275. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-663, INFORMATION RESELLERS:
CONSUMER PRIVACY FRAMEWORK NEEDS TO REFLECT CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGY AND THE
MARKETPLACE 7 (2013). For example, users cannot “untag” themselves from photos unless
they join Facebook. DENHAM, supra note 274, at 70. Facebook, for its part, regards the only
issue as one of copyright and stated to investigators that “the reproduction rights for a
photograph or video generally belong to the person who took it,” and the “responsibility for
obtaining the consent of non-users rests not with Facebook, but rather with the users who
upload non-users’ personal information.” Id. at 72.
276. Glenn Greenwald, Opinion, FISA Court Oversight: A Look Inside a Secret and Empty
Process, GUARDIAN (June 18, 2013, 7:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2013/jun/19/fisa-court-oversight-process-secrecy [https://perma.cc/E87B-HRFF].
277. One district court has accepted this conclusion in the WikiLeaks case involving
Twitter user information. See In re United States, 830 F. Supp. 2d 114, 129, 138 (E.D. Va.
2011); In re § 2703(d) Order, 787 F. Supp. 2d 430, 436 (E.D. Va. 2011); see also supra notes
113–16 and accompanying text.
278. This is part of what Maciej Ceglowski—an entrepreneur and frequent speaker on
technology policy—has advocated for. Maciej Ceglowski, Haunted by Data, IDLE WORDS,
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or at least less than their competitors do.279 But there are serious limits to
this good-intentions model of network-intermediary behavior. For one thing,
network service providers must build their products in compliance with
applicable law, which may restrict their design decisions. Rozenshtein
argues that it may be necessary to “demand technological impact assessments
before a technology company develops a product or service that disrupts a
key government function like effective surveillance.”280 Whatever the merits
of such proposals or their feasibility, it would be necessary for network
service providers of any meaningful size to obey them if they were
implemented.281
More to the point, many network intermediaries have built their businesses
on collecting private user data. Knowing things about people is valuable, at
least potentially. It is of no use to tell a digital-advertising network that it
should learn less about the people who see its ads: that information is their
asset. So for as long as collecting such user data remains legal and valuable,
companies that decline to do so will operate at a relative competitive
disadvantage to those that do not.282
B. Information as a Toxic Asset
A better solution is to recognize that personal information, for all its value
to the companies that gather it, also has harmful side effects. It is, as Schneier
puts it, a potentially “toxic asset.”283 The question is what to do about it. The
http://idlewords.com/talks/haunted_by_data.htm [https://perma.cc/XR9S-43Y7] (last visited
Apr. 13, 2018). “If you can get away with it,” he argues, “don’t collect it,” and “if you have
to collect it, don’t store it!” (“You can get a lot of mileage out of ephemeral data.”) And if
you “have to store it, don’t keep it,” at least not “forever.” Id.
279. At present, the most prominent example is Apple, which often boasts about how little
information it collects about its customers. See, e.g., Matthew Panzarino, Apple’s Tim Cook
Delivers Blistering Speech on Encryption, Privacy, TECHCRUNCH (June 2, 2015),
https://techcrunch.com/2015/06/02/apples-tim-cook-delivers-blistering-speech-onencryption-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/WD9M-UMB2] (noting Apple CEO Tim Cook’s
assertion in a speech that while “some of the most prominent and successful companies have
built their businesses by lulling their customers into complacency about their personal
information” while “gobbling up everything they can learn about you and trying to monetize
it,” he was of the view that this was “wrong”).
280. Rozenshtein, supra note 13, at 182.
281. By way of analogy, before the relaxation of export controls on cryptography in the
United States, commercial software providers almost universally obeyed such controls. See
Swire & Ahmad, supra note 122, at 437–39 (detailing the history of the “crypto wars” and
export controls). Interestingly, however, even during this period, free software that
implemented strong encryption was “widely available on the Internet.” Id. at 439 & n.48
(discussing PGP—short for “Pretty Good Privacy”).
282. For this reason, Apple’s privacy stance has been criticized by market analysts who
would like to see the company collect far more information about its users than it currently
does. See, e.g., Eric Jackson, Apple Has to Get over Its Privacy Hang-Ups and Launch Better
Services, CNBC (June 28, 2017, 2:14 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/28/apple-has-toget-over-its-privacy-hang-ups-commentary.html [https://perma.cc/8X9P-8T42].
283. See also Bruce Schneier, Data Is a Toxic Asset, so Why Not Throw It out?, CNN (Mar.
1, 2016, 12:12 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/01/opinions/data-is-a-toxic-assetopinion-schneier/index.html [https://perma.cc/44LE-5BME] (“Data is a toxic asset. We need
to start thinking about it as such, and treat it as we would any other source of toxicity. To do
anything else is to risk our security and privacy.”). I am not the first to employ an
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widespread collection of private data, which in turn enables government
surveillance, is not something individual people can easily avoid. It is also
caused by the instrumentally rational decisions of businesses. Yet it threatens
serious social harm. That is a classic sort of market failure—an
environmental externality. In his classic article “The Tragedy of the
Commons,” Garrett Hardin analogized the problem of pollution to the
decisions facing self-interested herdsmen grazing their flock on an open
pasture.284 Just as each herdsman asks only about “the utility to me of adding
one more animal to my herd,”285 so too must each network intermediary only
ask about the value to themselves of collecting, storing, and retaining the
marginal bit of user data. Just as a rational herdsman will therefore tend to
“add another animal to his herd” (“[a]nd another; and another”),286 so too
will intermediaries tend to stockpile data that may be of commercial use to
them. The grazing of animals, to be clear, is socially useful, just as collecting
information is—but grazing also produces social harm, just as the collection
of information does. The problem is that the herdsman does not bear that
harm personally, just as network intermediaries are not the ones who are
principally harmed by the enhanced potential for surveillance. In the face of
these mismatched incentives, we must, as Hardin advocates, avoid the
looming tragedy by legislating not prohibition but “temperance.”287
This Part lays out a framework for what temperance might look like. In
the context of environmental law, Lewis Kornhauser and Richard Revesz
have argued that a regulatory regime for toxic materials must decide both the
“volume of hazardous wastes” that will be produced and when (and how) to
“dispose of the wastes.”288 Similarly, here, an ex ante regulatory regime for
network intermediaries must decide both what intermediaries may learn
about us and how long they may retain that knowledge. This Part argues that
such a framework solves, as a side effect, data breaches by both private
parties and foreign governments—problems that on some accounts are even
environmental analogy for data collection in a general sense, but the existing scholarly
literature has not developed the concept in detail, and has not focused on the problem of
surveillance. Dennis Hirsch has argued in favor of “emissions fees” for commercial email to
fight the environmental problem of spam but does not discuss the problem of surveillance.
Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can Learn
from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 40–41 (2006). Ira Rubenstein (citing Hirsch at
points) uses the concept to explore the subject of “privacy self-regulation,” but again does not
discuss surveillance. See generally Ira S. Rubenstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation:
Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes, 6 I/S 355 (2010). This gap in the literature is due to a failure
to account for the argument developed in Part II: if no firm line can be drawn between industry
and government data collection in the long run, then a primary harm of industrial data
collection will continue to be that it enables government surveillance.
284. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968)
(explaining that such arrangements “may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries” but
eventually “comes the day of reckoning,” when “the inherent logic of the commons
remorselessly generates tragedy”).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1245–46.
288. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Regulation of Hazardous Wastes, in 3
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 238, 238–39 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998).

2916

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

more serious than surveillance. In part for that reason, this framework may
be more politically feasible than direct regulation of the government’s
authority to command information and aid; at a minimum, it faces a different
set of political challenges, such that it may prove to be a more realistic
solution.
1. Regulating the Collection and Storage of Information
Conceptually, for any information that is conceivably collected about
people, the law must answer two related questions: When is it legal to gather
that information? And once it is gathered, how long may it be retained?
Under American law at present, the answer to those questions (with very
minor exceptions) is that anything may be gathered by anyone and kept
forever. This Part argues that this response is implausibly extreme, and that
our present laissez-faire approach is, in fact, the root cause of the surveillance
problem this Article describes. Rules about collection and retention should
vary according to the type of data at issue and the intermediary that proposes
to gather it.
Before beginning this discussion in earnest, two notes on terminology.
When I describe the collection of data, I mean data that is acquired by the
network intermediary “in the clear”—that is, in a form that can be understood
and used by the network intermediary itself. This is in contrast to an
intermediary that collects information only in an encrypted form, such that
its contents remain accessible to the user, or others on the user’s demand, but
not to the network intermediary itself. In the latter circumstance, the network
intermediary does not actually have access to information in a form that is of
concern. Moreover, when I speak of disposing of or destroying data, I am
aware that depending on how that disposal is accomplished, forensic
techniques may be available that can still recover it.289 My intent is to bracket
that issue, and assume that to the extent law requires data to be disposed of,
it is done in a manner that makes it nonrecoverable for practical purposes.
The United States currently has no general regulatory framework for the
gathering of personal information about users of networked services and
devices. There are no rules that “collectively address the acquisition, storage,
transmission, use and disclosure of personal information within the business
community.”290 Not even informal “standards” really exist to limit the
289. See, for example, Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 587 A.2d 1353 (Pa. 1991), in which
the police recovered a draft ransom note from the defendant’s home computer after he
attempted to delete it. For further discussion, see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in
Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?,” 33 CONN. L.
REV. 503, 516 (2001) (discussing Copenhefer). Depending on the resources one is willing to
invest in the problem, some truly exotic techniques are available, including the use of magnetic
force microscopes and Bayesian statistical approaches, although the efficacy of these
techniques is (at present) limited. See generally Craig Wright, Dave Kleiman & Shyaam
Sundhar, Overwriting Hard Drive Data: The Great Wiping Controversy, in INFORMATION
SYSTEMS SECURITY: 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, HYDERABAD, INDIA, DECEMBER 16–
20, 2008 PROCEEDINGS 243–57 (R. Sekar & Arun K. Pujari eds., 2008).
290. Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for
Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 208 (1992).
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“collection and utilization of personal data in cyberspace.”291 The Wiretap
Act specifically permits an “officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire
or electronic communication service” to intercept and use communications
of its users in the ordinary course of providing services.292 Moreover, as
Patricia Bellia has observed, American law says “little” about data retention,
and much of what it does say “provides incentives for indefinite data
retention.”293
There are a few scattered exceptions. The rule implementing the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, for example, restricts the
collection of photographs of children under thirteen.294 The Video Privacy
Protection Act requires destruction of personally identifiable information “as
soon as practicable, but no later than one year from the date the information
is no longer necessary.”295 Similarly, the Cable Communications Policy Act
of 1984 provides that cable operators “shall destroy personally identifiable
information if the information is no longer necessary for the purpose for
which it was collected.”296 But as Bellia observes, even these isolated and
“sector-specific exceptions” are weak: they require “destruction of data only
when the data is no longer ‘necessary,’ and they leave the question of
necessity entirely within the data collector’s discretion.”297
As to some classes of data, the optimal solution might be to simply forbid
intermediaries (or at least some intermediaries) from collecting it. This might
be especially appropriate for what Paul Ohm calls “sensitive information.”298
The European Union’s Data Processing Directive, for example, has a
distinctive set of rules for how information about “racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union
membership, and . . . data concerning health or sex life” is collected.299 This
sort of information is generally singled out for protection because of its
unique ability to harm people when it falls into the wrong hands.300 At least
under some circumstances, the government might be the wrong hands—a
potential “adversary,” to use Ohm’s term.301 For example, in December
2016, many engineers working at technology firms signed a pledge saying
291. Schwartz, supra note 13, at 1611. This regulatory vacuum is no accident but the result
of a “multi-year effort” by American companies to convince the government that “we don’t
need regulations on data collection.” SCHNEIER, supra note 13, at 197. The potential political
economy problems that industry might pose are addressed at greater length infra. See infra
Part III.B.2.
292. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a) (2012).
293. Patricia L. Bellia, The Memory Gap in Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 138
(2008).
294. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2018). Section 1303
of the Act prohibits collecting “personal information from a child” except in accordance with
its procedures, which generally require parental consent. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(a)–(b) (2012).
295. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(e) (2012).
296. 47 U.S.C. § 551(e) (2012).
297. Bellia, supra note 293, at 151–52.
298. See generally Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125 (2015).
299. Council Directive 95/46, art. 8, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40 (EC).
300. Ohm, supra note 298, at 1161 (“Information is deemed sensitive if adversaries (to use
the computer scientific term) can use it to cause harm to data subjects or related people.”).
301. Id.
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that they would “refuse to participate in the creation of databases of
identifying information for the United States government to target
individuals based on race, religion, or national origin.”302 Those engineers
also pledged to advocate within their organizations “to minimize the
collection and retention of data that would facilitate ethnic or religious
targeting[,] to scale back existing datasets with unnecessary racial, ethnic,
and national origin data[, and] to responsibly destroy high-risk datasets and
backups.”303 Gathering this sort of information, they feared, might facilitate
impermissible targeting of vulnerable populations by a hostile government
that came wielding the new writs of assistance.304
The law should restrict the collection of less-sensitive information, like
location data, to certain sorts of network service providers. A mobile phone
service must collect location information because the customer has to
communicate with radio towers to use the service, and which ones the
customer uses will necessarily reveal the user’s location.305 More simply, a
service designed to offer driving directions has to know where you are for it
to do its job. But in other instances, location information is gathered simply
to target advertisements,306 or sell it to someone else, as was the case with a
third-party flashlight app that gathered users’ location information when
used.307 While restricting the collection of semisensitive information still
provides the government with some targets to collect it from, it would at least
reduce the scale of the problem.
The law must also provide an answer to how long information we give to
intermediaries may be retained. Other than “indefinitely,” there are two
kinds of answers to that question, both of which might be appropriate for
some types of data. One answer is “until a user asks that it be removed.”
Evocatively, this concept is sometimes called the “right to be forgotten.”308
Such “rights” depend on user initiative: that is, you’ve got to ask.309 There
have been legitimate concerns raised about this “right” under American law,
302. Matt Day, Amazon, Microsoft Workers Sign ‘Never Again’ Pledge to Oppose Trump’s
Call for Muslim Registry, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 15, 2016, 3:45 PM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/microsoft/never-again-pledge-draws-tech-workerswho-vow-not-to-help-build-possible-registry/ [https://perma.cc/6KF3-CA5S].
303. Our Pledge, NEVERAGAIN.TECH, http://neveragain.tech [https://perma.cc/KB2CFDJP] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
304. See id.
305. See Samuel, supra note 10, at 1327–28 (describing how this aspect of cellular phone
service can be used to infer someone’s location).
306. See Gordon C. Bruner II & Anand Kumar, Attitude Toward Location-Based
Advertising, J. INTERACTIVE ADVERT., July 2013, at 3–5.
307. Robert McMillan, The Hidden Privacy Threat of . . . Flashlight Apps?, WIRED (Oct.
20, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/10/iphone-apps/ [https://perma.cc/2CP973PF]. Another flashlight app, “Brightest Flashlight Free,” was fined by the FTC for
deceiving its users about how their location information would be used. Press Release, FTC,
Android Flashlight App Developer Settles FTC Charges It Deceived Customers (Dec. 5,
2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/12/android-flashlight-appdeveloper-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived [https://perma.cc/KN5W-YGEX].
308. See generally MEG LETA JONES, CTRL + Z: THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN (2016).
309. Id. at 27–54 (detailing a large number of requests to Google to remove information
about private people).
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especially to the extent it has been applied to limit the dissemination of public
records.310 But the new writs of assistance suggest that at least a modest ondemand disposal regime is necessary as a safety valve, in the event of
expanded government surveillance authority. When Congress or the courts
make new information available to the government, they generally do so
retroactively—that is, the government gets access to information that already
exists, not just information that is created or collected after that moment.311
Information must therefore be shared with network service providers without
knowing, in advance, what the government’s ability to get it will be. When
the government acquires new authority to get information or assistance from
network service providers, it should be possible to remove the information
we have stored about us if that new authority changes the calculus of what
we are willing to share. Imagine being a member of a minority religion and
witnessing the election of a hostile government in your home country.
Imagine further that the new hostile government successfully persuaded the
legislature or the courts to empower it to get assistance from social networks
like Facebook in identifying members of your sect for what it claimed were
“national security reasons.” In this situation, you would want to have a right
to insist that Facebook delete your religious affiliation from its records. This
right to insist that networks delete the information that might identify you
would be consistent with what you would have shared in the first place had
you known what was going to happen.
The problem with on-demand disposal is that it replicates many of the
market failures that prompt the need for regulation in the first place. People
do not always know who has collected information about them, especially
when the collection has been done indirectly (by purchasing or otherwise
acquiring it from the entities that directly observed and collected the
information), and so people will not always know who to ask for deletion.
Therefore, the law can and should require the automatic disposal of private
information by network intermediaries in more circumstances than it does
now by requiring the disposal of some information after a time certain, rather
than upon user demand. The justification for such a system is conceptually
similar to the one for statutes of limitation and repose: the peace that comes
from knowing, after a certain period, that the events of the past will not come
310. See, e.g., Martin v. Hearst, 777 F.3d 546, 551 (2d Cir. 2015) (concluding that a
Connecticut statute “does not render historically accurate news accounts of an arrest tortious
merely because the defendant is later deemed as a matter of legal fiction never to have been
arrested”); Alison Frankel, No ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Even If Record Is Expunged: 2nd
Circuit, REUTERS (Jan. 28, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/01/28/noright-to-be-forgotten-even-if-record-is-expunged-2nd-circuit/
[https://perma.cc/7AMTLFAB].
311. For example, in 2001, Congress expanded the FBI’s authority to issue NSLs in the
USA PATRIOT Act, such that the FBI could issue them in “circumstances roughly
comparable to those in which a federal prosecutor could obtain a grand jury subpoena.”
Nieland, supra note 106, at 1202; see also Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 482–84
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting the attempt to “harmonize” NSL practice with prosecutors’ power
using grand jury subpoenas).
But nothing in the legislation restricted this new
pseudosubpoena power to obtaining information that was given to network service providers
after the effective date of the Act.
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to radically disturb your present circumstances.312 By analogy, a person
should know that after a certain amount of time has passed, the government
cannot drudge up certain types of old information about them. Consider
location information: an automatic disposal rule for location information
would permit a person to be sure after (say) ninety days that his or her visit
to an abortion clinic, labor union hall, or temple would no longer be retained.
However, automatic disposal cannot and should not be universal—
sometimes indefinite storage is precisely what we want, as is the case with
many users wanting their emails or photos retained indefinitely in the cloud
by their provider so they do not have to personally attend to backing them up
locally. In that circumstance, storing the information indefinitely but using
a collection restriction, such as keeping the information in an encrypted
format, is a superior solution.
Decisions about the generation and disposal of information interact
because, as Michael Froomkin has observed, the way in which the law
regulates data retention will also affect incentives for data collection.313 To
the extent that information is more useful or valuable when it can be retained
for longer, permitting its indefinite retention will tend to encourage more
collection at the front end. By contrast, if information must generally be
deleted after a short time or after certain conditions are met, thereby rendering
it less valuable, less of it may be collected in the first place. For this and
other reasons, determining and implementing details of a framework like this
one would no doubt be complex. Whatever body is charged with doing so (a
new expert agency, for example) would need to make determinations about
what types of information were sensitive and should be regulated, what types
of intermediaries should be permitted to collect what sort of information, and
what time limits make sense for the retention of that which would be
gathered. While this Article does not propose to resolve every detail with
this framework, if accepted, it would at least supply the right questions. What
should network intermediaries be able to learn about us? Which
intermediaries? And for how long? At the moment, we are not asking those
questions at all—and so we are having the answers implicitly supplied by the
commercial logic of businesses especially the advertising-technology
industry. It may be that our present regulatory vacuum on these questions is
socially optimal, although I doubt it. But even a conscious decision to leave
things as they are would be superior to the present state of affairs.
2. Considerations of Political Economy
One possible objection to the above might go: If the government wants
this information, what incentive would it have to adopt the sorts of
regulations this Article describes? If my descriptive claims about the
312. See Holmes, supra note 163, at 477 (“A thing which you have enjoyed and used as
your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot
be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came
by it. The law can ask no better justification than the deepest instincts of man.”).
313. A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1542–43 (2000)
(“Rules about data retention and use will shape what is collected and how it is done.”).
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government’s likely motivations and behavior in Part II are correct, what
chance does this proposal have? Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule call this
problem the “inside/outside fallacy.”314 This problem occurs, they argue,
when “the analyst is combining ideal with nonideal theory in an incoherent
way, positing nonideal motivations for purposes of diagnosis and then
positing idealized motivations for purposes of prescription.”315 In the
welfare-economics literature, this is known as the “determinacy
paradox”316—an analyst must account not only for “what solution a
benevolent social planner would desire to institute,”317 but also for “who will
have the incentives to supply that solution, given the analyst’s diagnosis of
the problem.”318
Upon closer examination, however, regulating network intermediaries
actually enjoys certain advantages on this dimension over the “collect and
resist” strategy described skeptically in Part II. Whenever the first order
cause of the harm is the government, proposals for reform typically must
grapple with the inside/outside fallacy. The usual way in which this is done
is by positing the hypothetical presence of different motivations for the
judiciary or legislatures than for the executive, and arguing for constraining
the problematic behaviors via legislation or court action.319 That is internally
coherent, but, as I argue in Part II, when it comes to this particular issue,
judges and legislatures are typically part of the problem, and at any rate may
be limited in their ability to practically constrain the executive. So if the
actors in the U.S. legal system as a whole are systemically favorable to
government demands for information and aid, any workable solution must
come with an explanation for how it can overcome that systemic
characteristic, rather than simply wishing it did not exist. Regulation of data
collection and retention enjoys a few advantages along this dimension, at
least when compared to attempts to regulate the government’s authority to
demand assistance.
First, treating surveillance as a harm created by the stockpiling of
information and then proposing to regulate the stockpile mitigates other

314. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
1743, 1745–47 (2013).
315. Id. at 1744.
316. See Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Richard A. Brecher & T.N. Srinivasan, DUP Activities and
Economic Theory, in NEOCLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: THE ANALYSIS OF RENT-SEEKING
AND DUP ACTIVITIES 17 (David C. Colander ed., 1984).
317. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 314, at 1746.
318. Id. at 1747; see also James E. Fleming, Toward a More Democratic Congress?, 89
B.U. L. REV. 629, 639–40 (2009) (negatively assessing proposals for congressional
improvement that require legislative approval); Mark Tushnet, Some Skepticism About
Normative Constitutional Advice, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1473, 1474 (2008) (arguing that
advice about constitutional design must account for the “political considerations” of the
relevant actors).
319. See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 293, at 167. Professor Bellia notes that “there are strong
arguments for favoring stable application of certain key constitutional and quasi-constitutional
baselines in surveillance law” and suggests ways that “we might translate those baselines for
a world of increasingly perfect memory.” Id. She posits a doctrinal, court-based solution to
the problem she identifies.
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harms created by that stockpiling.320 One of those harms is theft: if network
intermediaries stored less private information, they would be less likely to
have it stolen, either by insiders or outside hackers.321 As Bruce Schneier
observed, data theft is a serious problem: “Every week, thieves break into
networks and steal data about people, often tens of millions at a time.”322
Such thefts can be used to commit identity fraud.323 The data may also be
used to commit blackmail—consider the 2015 theft of identifying
information from Ashley Madison, a website designed to help married people
have affairs.324 Beyond private thefts, network intermediaries with large
stockpiles of information are also an attractive target for foreign adversaries.
In March 2016, John Podesta—then the chairman of Hillary Clinton’s
presidential campaign—had his email compromised in a data breach that was
linked to the Russian government.325 Those emails, going back years, were
subsequently published during the waning days of a presidential election in
ways that deeply troubled U.S. intelligence services.326 Regulations that
would reduce these problems in addition to reducing the government’s own
320. The dynamic is similar, at a high level of generality, to James Tobin’s proposal for a
tax on cross-border currency transactions. See generally James Tobin, A Proposal for
International Monetary Reform, 4 E. ECON. J. 153 (1978). Tobin’s aim was to cushion
exchange rate fluctuations by imposing very small taxes on exchanges of one currency to
another, which had the side effect of generating revenue for the government. Id. at 155. That
side effect has, consequently, often served as the principal justification for “Tobin taxes” of
various sorts. See, e.g., Kelsey Snell, Sanders Goes Robin Hood with Plan to Make Wall Street
Pay for College, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
powerpost/wp/2016/01/26/sanders-goes-robin-hood-with-plan-to-make-wall-street-pay-forcollege [https://perma.cc/4BWS-UHCD] (noting Bernie Sanders’s proposal of a “tax on
speculation” to help eliminate tuition at public colleges and universities).
321. As Ed Felten observed, there is no technical difference between a court order to turn
over data and an “inside attack” of a malicious kind:
From a purely technological standpoint, these two scenarios are exactly the same:
an employee copies user data and gives it to an outside party. Only two things are
different: the employee’s motivation, and the destination of the data after it leaves
the company. Neither of these differences is visible to the company’s technology—
it can’t read the employee’s mind to learn the motivation, and it can’t tell where the
data will go once it has been extracted from the company’s system. Technical
measures that prevent one access scenario will unavoidably prevent the other one.
Ed Felten, A Court Order Is an Insider Attack, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Oct. 15, 2013),
https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2013/10/15/a-court-order-is-an-insider-attack/
[https://perma.cc/E8PY-TY6P].
322. Schneier, supra note 283.
323. Id.
324. See Kim Zetter, Hackers Finally Post Stolen Ashley Madison Data, WIRED (Aug. 18,
2015, 5:55 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/08/happened-hackers-posted-stolen-ashleymadison-data/ [https://perma.cc/5B6D-REU9] (discussing hackers’ release of Ashley
Madison customer information online in an attempt to blackmail the website’s owner to take
down the site as well as a similar sister site).
325. Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, How Hackers Broke Into John Podesta and Colin
Powell’s Gmail Accounts, MOTHERBOARD (Oct. 20, 2016, 9:30 AM),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/mg7xjb/how-hackers-broke-into-john-podestaand-colin-powells-gmail-accounts [https://perma.cc/4EC6-AX9L].
326. Greg Miller & Adam Entous, Declassified Report Says Putin “Ordered” Effort to
Undermine Faith in U.S. Election and Help Trump, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/5f591416-d41a-11e6-9cb0-54ab630851e8_story.html
[https://perma.cc/3Z9S-PRJT].
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capacity for surveillance might be politically viable in a way that a proposal
that only reduced the government’s powers would not.327
In addition, network service providers often operate in more than one
jurisdiction and so are subject to regulation by multiple governments, some
of which might have different views on surveillance policy, which might be
able to change an intermediary’s behavior worldwide. Facebook reports that
it had over two billion monthly active users at the end of 2017,328 meaning
not just the majority but the vast majority of its users were outside the United
States.329 And the European Union’s new General Data Protection
Regulation contains requirements consistent with much of what this Article
suggests above,330 including on-demand deletion and limitations on data
collection.331 The Regulation will require affected companies—everyone
doing business in the EU—to update the user interface of their software to
offer the required options to EU users, respond to personal data-export and
data-deletion requests, develop audit and compliance reporting tools, and so
on.332 Once that work is done, the costs of offering it to Americans is
significantly decreased, and companies may find it impossible as a practical
matter not to do so. Facebook’s implementation of “hard delete on user
accounts,” the ability of users to delete their account permanently, was
similarly done to comply with EU rules.333 But because of Facebook’s
internal data architecture, it was necessary to make the feature available to
all users.334
The major political economy downside to a proposed regulation on
industry is the industry. As noted above,335 there is a reason U.S. law treats
this industry the way it does: it is a major force in American politics, and
distinctively so, because the major network intermediaries are American
companies. The same could be said of every industry that has ever been
regulated,336 so this objection is not necessarily fatal. But it is a drawback to
327. Moreover, ex ante regulation of network intermediaries takes place outside the
exigencies that might be generated by a given moment—the Apple-FBI dispute, for example,
had to be litigated in the immediate wake of a terrible, violent attack. See supra notes 44–46,
89–92 and accompanying text.
328. Company Info, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/
[https://perma.cc/9293-B54D] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
329. U.S.
and
World
Population
Clock,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/popclock/ [https://perma.cc/7AMN-B5DB] (last visited Apr. 13,
2018) (noting that the population of the United States is just over 327 million).
330. See supra Part III.B.1.
331. See GDPR Key Changes, EUGDPR.ORG, http://www.eugdpr.org/key-changes.html
[https://perma.cc/9S45-LZ3S] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
332. See Dean Alvarez, The Impact of GDPR Outside the EU, IT SECURITY GURU (Jan. 30,
2017), http://www.itsecurityguru.org/2017/01/30/impact-gdpr-outside-eu/ [https://perma.cc/
L64D-KQHW].
333. Notes from an Emergency, IDLE WORDS, http://idlewords.com/talks/notes_
from_an_emergency.htm [https://perma.cc/F8F8-P5WE] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
334. See id. (“That feature was added with a lot of grumbling, but because of the way
Facebook organizes its data, they had to make it work the same for all users. So a European
regulation led to a victory for privacy worldwide.”).
335. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
336. For example, Rozenshtein, in the service of a different point, optimistically notes that
“[a] century ago our society was one of railroads,” that network service providers might be
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the framework worth taking seriously: in addition to solving more problems,
the proposal would also have more opponents, and perhaps not in a way that
would provide a net advantage. But to the extent one is skeptical about the
feasibility of directly regulating the government’s powers to demand
assistance, the mix of affected interests is at least different from what this
Article proposes, which might make its viability a hypothesis worth
disproving.
CONCLUSION
We tend to think of surveillance as a problem created by the government,
and thus one to be solved by further regulation of the government itself. This
Article argues for a different view. We are experiencing a surveillance
problem that is, in fact, downstream from a more general problem: too much
data is being collected about us by private companies and retained for too
long. That enables too much surveillance, yes—but nothing about the
government has changed. The government wants to solve crimes, gather
intelligence, and learn whatever it can in service of what it perceives to be its
legitimate ends. Our law is structured to accommodate that goal, and it is
hard to imagine that it would not be. What has changed is that there are now
private entities that collectively aim to know every detail of our lives, from
cradle to grave. They have the technology to gather it, they have the space
to store it, and they have built businesses on getting it.
The general dynamic goes well beyond surveillance. The rise of a new
class of incredibly powerful firms that dominate an important sector of the
modern economy, and the ways in which they interact with the government
and the public sphere, raises difficult questions about the structure of society
in the future. For better or worse, we are used to Leviathan—our law and our
norms have grown up understanding the awesome power of the state. What
we have not yet come to grips with is the new power of these network
intermediaries and what we are to do about them. The first step, this Article
argues, is to decide what we will let them know and remember about us. But
that will not be the last.

thought of as “the railroad companies of the twenty-first century,” and that, in the end, “[t]he
railroads ultimately lost their independence.” Rozenshtein, supra note 13, at 188.

